Daily Report

Latin America

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FBIS-LAT-87-236 *9 December 1987*

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Ibero-American Parliaments Issue Statement

PY052005 Montevideo Radio El Espectador Network in Spanish 1600 GMT 5 Dec 87

[Text] The presidents of democratic Ibero-American parliaments who met in Montevideo issued a seven-point statement at the end of their fifth conference today. The document refers to issues related to regional parliaments, the situation in Central America, the recent Acapulco summit, Bolivia's landlocked problem, computer sciences, and the creation of the Institute for Parliamentary Rights.

Regarding regional parliaments, the presidents of Ibero-American parliaments decided to recommend to the governments and parliaments of Latin American countries to immediately consider the ratification of the treaty for institutionalization of the Latin American Parliament, as well as the constitutional treaty of the Central American Parliament. They also offered their broadest cooperation for the attainment of these objectives. They also expressed their fervent hope that Central American and Andean parliaments will contribute decisively to the consolidation of the Latin American Parliament as a way to achieve the political, economic, and cultural integration of Latin America.

Regarding the situation in Central America, they decided to support the peace plan adopted on 7 August 1987 by the presidents of Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and El Salvador, as a procedure to establish a firm and long-lasting peace in Central America. This plan is called Esquipulas II. The presidents of the Ibero-American parliaments expressed firm hope that this document will become an effective instrument for peace in Central America, a document that will guarantee overall respect for human rights and liberties in the region.

They also decided to express solidarity with efforts by the five Central American presidents in their respective countries to guarantee the fulfillment of what was agreed upon in Esquipulas.

Regarding the recent Group of Eight summit in Acapulco, they expressed satisfaction with the agreements reached. They also expressed solidarity with the objectives outlined in Acapulco for peace and democracy, and encouragement for all the efforts at development put forward in that document.

Regarding Bolivia's landlocked problem, they stated it is of continuing interest to Ibero-American countries to find an equitable solution to the Bolivian maritime issue so Bolivia can obtain a sovereign and useful maritime coast. They added the parties in conflict must reach a peaceful negotiated solution to this problem within the framework of international solidarity and justice.

Regarding the use of computers to support parliamentary activities, they stressed the usefulness of data processing to modernize parliamentary activities and to facilitate decisionmaking. They stressed the need to establish mechanisms for computer interconnections among Ibero-American parliaments.

Regarding the creation of the Institute for Parliamentary Rights, they recommended that the Ibero-American parliaments promote this institute in order to facilitate understanding, studies, and research in comparative parliamentary rights; to assess the role of modern parliaments; to assemble and organize current parliamentary rules; and to prepare works intended to achieve legal instruments for the more effective performance of parliaments.

In conclusion, the fifth conference has instructed the presidents of the parliaments of Bolivia, Ecuador, Spain, and Uruguay to prepare a draft bill on the rules for the functioning of the conference of presidents of Ibero-American parliaments to be submitted for the consideration of the sixth meeting that will be held in Sucre, Bolivia, in 1988.

Iglesias Opens GATT Forum in Punta del Este

PY081336 Montevideo Radio Carve in Spanish 0000 GMT 8 Dec 87

[Text] In Punta del Este, government experts from 17 Latin American nations today began to review negotiations conducted within the framework of the GATT. The meetings, held during a regional seminar on Latin America and the GATT Uruguayan round of talks, will continue until 9 December. The seminar is sponsored by ECLA, SELA, and UNCTAD.

Uruguayan Foreign Minister Enrique Iglesias, the president of the GATT negotiations committee, opened the seminar today; participants are Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Chile, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

In the opening session, with top officials from ALADI, ECLA, GATT, (?OLADE), SELA, and UNCTAD in attendence, Iglesias said a significant number of nations are expressing a willingness to expedite the negotiations in order to reach a concrete decision in the GATT Uruguayan round of talks in late 1988.

According to Iglesias, several countries, mainly the United States, are promoting the adoption of prompt decisions because it is felt this is an important element in the internal debate in the United States between the protectionist and open policy factions.

The Uruguayan foreign minister, who stated Japan and some European nations are also in favor of prompt decisions, said the idea of an early decision has become a domestic policy problem for the United States.

Iglesias reasserted that the achievement of agreements in the negotiations scheduled for late 1988 could prevent protectionist trends from progressing and could become a stabilizing factor for the international economic situation. Iglesias described the internationel economic situation as unstable and full of surprises, with fluctuations in the significant international economic variables.

Iglesias held the industrialized nations responsible for their apparent inability to coordinate their macroeconomic policies.

Issues such as the GATT Uruguayan round of talks in the context of the current international economic situation, Latin American interests, and future North-South talks in light of the decisions made at the eighth UNCTAD meeting and the Uruguayan round of talks will be discussed during the seminar, whose informal nature precludes predicting concrete final decisions.

New CEPAL Executive Secretary Named

PY031156 Madrid EFE in Spanish 2227 GMT 2 Dec 87

[Text] Santiago, 2 Dec (EFE)—Guatemalan economist Gert Rosenthal has been named executive secretary of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL). This move was announced today by CEPAL, a UN organization headquartered in Santiago.

Rosenthal, who has been assistant executive secretary of CEPAL's Social and Economic Development Department for 2 years, was designated by the UN secretary general to replace Argentine Norberto Gonzalez who will retire on 31 December.

The new CEPAL executive secretary, born in 1925, is married and the father of four children; he will assume his post on 1 January 1988.

Panama Accepted as Observer in ALADI

PY040212 Madrid EFE in Spanish 0123 GMT 4 Dec 87

[Text] Montevideo, 3 Dec (EFE)—The committee of representatives of ALADI today decided to accept Panama as an observer in the organization. The Panamanian request, which was signed by Panamanian Foreign Minister Jorge Abadia Arias, was submitted on 13 Ocotber.

ALADI full members are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

ALADI observers are Spain, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Portugal, Cuba, Costa Rica, Italia, Nicaragua, and now, Panama.

The OAS, the IDB, the ECLA and the United Nations Development Program (PNUD) are also observers within ALADI.

Cuba

Risquet Visits Rome; To Meet With Leaders

FL082301 Havana Radio Reloj Network in Spanish 2057 GMT 8 Dec 87

[Text] A Cuban delegation headed by Jorge Risquet, member of the PCC Politburo, arrived today in Rome at the invitation of the Italian Communist Party. In addition to meeting with leaders of the Italian communist organization, Risquet and the delegation accompanying him will hold talks with Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti and Nilde Iotti, president of the Italian Chamber of Deputies.

New Civil Aeronautics Institute President

FL081242 Havana Tele-Rebelde Network in Spanish 1200 GMT 8 Dec 87

[Text] The Council of State has agreed to appoint Vicente Gomez Lopez as president of the Cuban Civil Aeronautics Institute. Comrade Gomez Lopez has been acting as director of the aviation pilots school [Comandante Ernesto Guevara Aviation Pilots Military School].

Dominican Republic

Imbert Says Haitian Arrests To Continue

FL081459 Santo Domingo Radio Mil Network in Spanish 1100 GMT 8 Dec 87

[Text] Armed Forces Secretary Antonio Imbert Barreras has said that the arrest of Haitians will continue. Remember, the Haitians have to cut sugarcane during the harvest, he said.

Imbert Barreras said that the members of the [word indistinct] institutes will assist in the imprisonment of Haitians in different locations throughout the country. The lieutenant general said the arrests will be done in accordance with the needs of the CEA [State Sugar Council] and the harvest plan developed by CEA authorities.

The military leader said most of those arrested have been Haitians who have left their sugarcane cutting responsibilities in the mills to which they had initially been assigned. Naturally they're needed for cutting sugarcane during the harvest; that's what they're getting paid for, said the Armed Forces secretary.

Imbert Barreras said once the sugar harvest has ended, the Haitians who were brought to the country for this purpose could proceed with other activities.

He said the Haitians arrested are being treated humanely. They are given food and their basic needs are being met.

The Armed Forces secretary said when the Haitians arrive at their work area, they are assigned a location where they can live with their family in a certain degree of comfort. He denied the arrested Haitians have been mistreated in order to force them into the sugarcane harvest at certain mills.

Those Haitians who went home to vote have been [words indistinct] and will not be able to return without up-to-date travel documents, unless they do this illegally, said Imbert Barreras.

Haiti

Groups Explain Dissociation From Strike

FL082212 Port-au-Prince Radio Nationale in Creole 1400 GMT 8 Dec 87

[Excerpts] Several organizations and political parties called for a general strike for yesterday, 7 December. [passage omitted]

Yesterday the People's National Assembly [APN], one of the groups that had organized and supported that general strike, and also the Socialist Workers League and the metropolitan area transport workers union, held a news conference at the Holiday Inn Le Plaza Hotel. The purpose of the news conference was to discuss the situation in Haiti and to offer the people a way to struggle against the policy of the National Government Council [CNG]. It was also intended to inform the press they were lifting the strike they had called for yesterday, Monday 7 December. They lifted their strike yesterday.

The representative of the APN explained to us why they were obliged to lift their strike that very Monday 7 December, on the 1st day of the 2-day nationwide strike they had announced. Let's listen to him.

[Begin recording] [First speaker, in progress]...of the reasons for lifting the strike on Monday is we did not call for a strike to support the Provisional Electoral Council [CEP]. The strike was called to get the provisional CNG [as heard] to leave power. Then we noticed that the opportunists, the FNC [National Concerted Action Front], hurried to put out their note first, together with Marc Bazin's MIDH [Movement for the Implementation of Democracy in Haiti]. They called for a general strike in support of the CEP.

We do not support the CEP, because the CEP plus the CNG equal suffering for the Haitian people and American domination of the Haitian people. Therefore we are not (?going to ask) the people to take to the streets, or make them sit at home, make them suffer, for those people. From now on, the people are no longer going to be used so the bourgeoisie or the opportunistic sector can look after their interests. We have already seen what we got from them on 29 November. They sent the people

out to vote in the CNG's elections and, because of this, many people died. So we are not going to send people out into the streets again for this.

When we saw the opportunists and the entire bourgeoisie got together to allegedly reestablish the CEP—a CEP which never acted in the interests of the people—the drivers, we of the APN, and all the other progressive organizations, such as the LOS, which is the Socialist Workers League, and all the other organizations that were at the meeting, decided we couldn't ask the people to take to the streets in the name of the CEP. The people cannot sit home in order to support the CEP. The people will sit home to make the government leave power, to uproot its cassava plants—but not to support the CEP.

[Second speaker, in progress] ...strike in Haiti, it is very difficult to get workers to go on strike. The worker sees that other workers are not mobilized, that there is a lack of motivation among the working class. It is we, the Metropolitan Area Transport Workers Union, who can go on strike, who can make the workers' voice heard, not only the voice of the drivers but the voice of workers in general. So, it is we who support the strike. And what is flagrant is that already last week, they had called for a strike, and people thumbed their noses at them. They paid no attention to them. And I think that if the strike caught on today, even partially, it is because we joined the strike. [end recording]

You just heard their reasons for lifting the strike announced for Monday 7 December and that was to have continued today, Tuesday 8 December. As we said, the strike was not the only reason for the news conference. The speakers also accused certain sectors of the population, particularly from among the democratic forces, of sort of being there to prevent the people's struggle from progressing.

[Begin recording] [Third speaker] The members of the FNC and the traditional candidates have shown they are worth nothing. Every time there is an attempt to get the CNG to leave power, it is they who block it. In July, when the entire population rose up, mobilized, in order to get the CNG to leave power, it was people like Jean-Claude Bajeux, Victor Benoit—people like that—who were attending talks at the National Palace in order to see how they could come to an understanding with the CNG. The CNG said nothing to them. It said: OK, no problem. They collaborated with them, and we saw what they gave us on 29 November. They all sent us to elections—IHRED [International Research and Development Institute of Haiti], the Konbitism [a philosophy of traditional Haitian cooperation, as seen in the "konbit", where people come together to effect a particular task for one of their numbers or for their community] people, and so forth. All those people were fixated on elections. And on 29 November, the Haitian people were massacred.

Today, instead of coming forth and saying elections cannot be held with the CNG in power, they don't even bring this up. Instead they ask that the CEP be reinstated. And at the same time they are asking that the CEP be reinstated, they are approaching people abroad to see if there are international forces that can come into Haiti. A concrete example of this is that we know (Moyse Senatus), who is a member of the FNC and who was a deputy candidate for Grande Anse, took a private plane yesterday and went to Washington to see if he can reach some kind of understanding in connection with the OAS meeting scheduled to discuss Haiti.

The Washington Office on Haiti [preceding office name rendered in English], has clearly stated, outright, that a foreign force must come to guarantee elections. So the policy these guys are effecting is, first of all, to ask for the reinstatement of the CEP. If the CNG makes a concession and gives them the CEP, they are going to come back and say: This CNG [as heard] cannot hold elections. We can't trust it. Now we need a foreign force to come into the country to ensure the elections. [end recording]

Meanwhile, Maurepas Auguste, leader of the MDU [Movement for Democratic Unity], has stated he was the first person to call for a general strike on Monday, 7 December 1987. Auguste says there is a kind of barrier, between the CNG and the people, that the CNG and the people are divided. Therefore he (?asks) that the CNG be replaced by another government composed of two patriotic members of the Armed Forces, a member of the Court of Cassation, and himself. [passage omitted].

FNC Calls 2-Day Strike 'Political Success'

FL082334 Port-au-Prince Radio Nationale in Creole 1400 GMT 8 Dec 87

[Excerpts] The National Concerted Action Front [FNC],one of the organizations that called a strike for yesterday and today [7 and 8 December] has sent us a news release dated 7 December 1987.

The Front states it felt, when the FNC and the political bureau of the Movement for the Implementation of Democracy [MIDH] called for a 2-day warning strike on 7 and 8 December 1987, that it was asking the Haitian people to make a sacrifice, necessary in view of the massacre of Sunday 29 November.

Further on the FNC says that considering it was aware money might be—was being—paid under the table to prevent the strike from catching on, it considers that the 7 December strike is a political success. It has noted many government employees stayed home and the private sector, especially merchants and industrialists, did not open their doors. In Port-au-Prince, teachers and students stayed home, and in many provinces, public transportation was not available.

The FNC says it learned with deep regret over the radio that certain people who call themselves patriots and unionists have decided to stop striking as of midnight on 7 December, yesterday. The front considers that decision a slap in the face of the Haitian people and of all patriots and a maneuver meant to divide and confuse the population.

The FNC accuses that group of people of more or less selling out the country to foreigners for 29 years and yet now claiming to be nationalists.

In conclusion, the FNC's secretariat says the reasons that made it call for a strike are still valid.

The FNC says: We inform everyone the strike is still on for today, Tuesday, 8 December, and we remind everyone what we are asking for. [passage omitted]

The note from the FNC secretariat is signed by Victor Benoit, Conacom [also, "Konakom", National Committee of the Congress of Democratic Movements]; and Serge Gilles, BIP [Bloc for Patriotic Unity]; and is dated 7 December 1987.

Group Asks People To Stage Demonstrations
FL082130 Port-au-Prince Radio Soleil in Creole 1200 GMT 8 Dec 87

[Text] The Association of Young Researchers of Port-au-Prince [AJAP] has issued a news release which says:

Port-au-Prince, 7 December 1987

We of the AJAP, declare that after all the acts of intimidation, underhanded dealings, persecution, and crimes committed by the authorities against the civilian population in an attempt to prevent elections from taking place and after they gave the Macoutes weapons and grenades so they could attack the National Palace to prevent change in Haiti, the government saw that nothing worked. That is why on 29 November the Haitian Army and the Macoutes effected a veritable massacre all over the country, and most particularly on Ruelle Vaillant, where these two sectors joined to machinegun the population and hack them to pieces with machetes.

The AJAP note continues: That is why the AJAP is asking all sectors of the population opposed to this massacre to do as our brothers and sisters in Miami, New York, Canada and elsewhere did. They want to take the bandits out of the game by holding big demonstrations. We ask public transport drivers, merchants, industrialists, and all other sectors in Haiti to stand fast. If they could sit home when the Macoutes decreed martial law in the country, why can't they do it for 2 or 3 days for the people's cause? Do they mean to support the murderous events and the massacre by the Macoutes on 29 November? Don't they know that apart from the 22 bodies found on Ruelle Vaillant on 29 November, many other people were machinegunned inside the school and had to run in an attempt to hide?

Be aware that those who refuse to support the people support the 29 November massacre instead. Think about that carefully, you drivers, merchants, industrialists, and so forth.

We take this opportunity to inform everyone that the death squads that were sowing death in Port-au-Prince have now gone into our provinces to operate. They have already begun operating in southeastern Haiti.

That was a note from AJAP, the Association of Young Researchers of Port-au-Prince.

Committee To Investigate 29 Nov Events
FL082153 Port-au-Prince Radio Nationale in Creole 1400 GMT 8 Dec 87

[Text] A news release from the Ministry of Information and Coordination says that the National Government Council has appointed, by decree dated 7 December 1987, the members of the special investigating committee charged with investigating the incidents that occurred throughout Haiti on Sunday, 29 November 1987, on the occasion of the elections.

The committee is composed of the following people: Attorney Luc D. Michel, chairman; Attorney (Yves Decady); Attorney (Yves Richard Morasse); Colonel Louis Thony-Fils, Hatiain Armed Forces [FADH]; Colonel Serge St-Eloi, FADH; and Attorney Ulrick Noel, a member.

These are the members of the committee that is going to investigate the incidents that took place in Haiti on Sunday 29 November 1987 on the occasion of the elections.

No Representatives Submitted for New CEP
FL082318 Port-au-Prince Radio Soleil in Creole 1200 GMT 8 Dec 87

[Excerpts] No organization has as yet submitted a representative to the National Government Council [CNG] so it can form a new Provisional Electoral Council [CEP]. [passage omitted]

There was a rumor to the effect that the Court of Cassation had submitted a name. An AFP cable had reported the Court of Cassation had sent a member. Several people have denied this. A judge denied the AFP report. Here is what the AFP report says. [passage omitted] Up to now, only the Court of Cassation has announced it has designated a new representative, (Lexius Pierre)—a lawyer from southeastern Haiti—to replace its former representative.

A judge from the Court of Cassation called us yesterday afternoon to inform us that all 12 members of the Court of Cassation had met and decided unanimously not to send anyone to the new CEP the CNG wants to form. Therefore, the report from AFP that says the Court of Cassation has sent a lawyer to represent it on the new CEP is false. [passage omitted]

Citizens Deny Sending Messages Supporting CNG

FL090145 Port-au-Prince Radio Soleil in Creole 1200 GMT 8 Dec 87

[Correspondent (Gerard Mesidor) reporting from Cap-Haitien]

[Text] In Cap-Haitian several citizens are angry because they heard their names announced over Tele-Nationale [the national television station, Radio Tele-Diffusion National d'Haiti, RTNH] as if they had sent messages of support for the government after the 29 November Ruelle Vaillant massacre.

[Begin (Mesidor) recording] This morning, we met with two or three people who were furious. When we sought to find out what was wrong with them, they said they had heard that their names were cited over the national television station. They said it was reported they had sent notes discussing the situation and supporting the National Government Council [CNG]. They asserted they didn't know anything about this, no one had ever contacted them, and they hadn't written any note supporting the CNG, as was being reported yesterday over the national television station.

They all said they have their suspicions as to how this happened but they must investigate and, as soon as they have proof against the people they suspect, they will denounce these people publicly. [end recording]

Private Economics Center Releases Forecasts
PA071303 Mexico City UNOMASUNO in Spanish 29 Nov 87 p 13

[Article by Rebeca Lizarraga R.]

[Excerpts] According to estimates from the Private Sector Center for Economic Studies (CEESP), the public sector deficit for 1988 will be 106.8 trillion pesos, which is equivalent to 22 percent of the gross domestic product, a level that has never been reached before. Moreover, according to forecasts from the highest-level economic analysis organization—the Business Sector Coordinating Council [Consejo Coordinador Empresarial]—inflation will reach 200 percent, and, by December 1988, the exchange rate will be 4,700 pesos. The dollar will close the year at that same exchange rate.

According to estimates, the public sector's foreign debt will be 6.7 trillion pesos (that is $2.3 billion, which is the maximum amount allowed), equivalent to 1.4 percent of the GDP. [passage omitted]

Regarding private sector financing, 33 trillion pesos is estimated for 1988, which is equivalent to 6.8 percent of the GDP. Financing for this sector in 1986 was 4 percent of the GDP, and in 1987 it was 7.5 percent. [passage omitted]

As for international reserves, the CEESP forecasts an increase of only 900 trillion pesos, but the Planning and Budget Secretariat does not predict an increase in reserves.

The private sector estimates the 1988 GDP will be 485.5 trillion pesos, while the government estimates it will be 405.7 trillion pesos. The GDP will be 183.2 trillion pesos in 1987, and in 1986 it was 77.8 trillion pesos.

According to the CEESP, the internal generation of resources for 1988 will be 133.1 trillion pesos and, according to the Planning and Budget Secretariat, it will be 87.3 trillion pesos, which will be equivalent to 21.5 percent of the GDP. The CEESP's figure (133.1 trillion pesos) would be equivalent to 27.4 percent of the GDP. [passage omitted]

Regarding inflation the CEESP forecasts two possibilities: the first one takes into account a decrease in inflation by means of the exchange and interest rates (which would reach a maximum of 150 percent); and the second one takes into account a more flexible policy regarding exchange and interest rates and, in this case, inflation would reach 180 to 200 percent by December 1988.

Belize

Parliament Approves Intelligence Service

FL081455 Bridgetown CANA in English 1753 GMT 6 Dec 87

[Text] Belmopan, Belize, Dec 6, CANA—The Belize parliament has given government the go-ahead to establish a security intelligence service [SIS], amid strong criticism from the opposition People's United Party (PUP).

The new law, passed last week, gives the SIS sweeping powers to conduct investigations regarding the loyalty of citizens to the state as it considers appropriate.

The law also gives the minister of home affairs the authority to give the SIS special assignments "and such other duties as may from time to time be specified by the minister."

Government said the aim of the SIS is to "protect Belize and its people from espionage, subversion and terrorism."

The bill was passed after a long and heated debate in the 28-member House of Representatives where government has a 21 seat majority.

Leader of the opposition Florencio Marin said the PUP was opposed to the bill as the SIS will "come under the direct control of a politician."

Marin also called on the House of Representatives to appoint a bi-partisan committee to probe charges against the opposition by the minister of home affairs, Curl Thompson, who linked opposition elements to communist and other foreign ideologies and the trafficking of arms and marijuana.

As parliament debated the bill, demonstrators outside carried placards denouncing the government move.

"SIS means no human rights"; "No oppression in Belize"; "We reject political secret police"; "SIS equals Gestapo", read some of the placards.

El Salvador

Duarte To Appoint Lopez Nuila Minister

PA081538 San Salvador Canal Doce Television in Spanish 0300 GMT 8 Dec 87

[Report by Alfredo Villarreal]

[Excerpt] During the opening of the seminar sponsored by CASALCO [Salvadoran Chamber of the Construction Industry], President Duarte was interviewed by newsmen. When questioned about the judge's ruling in favor of Major Roberto D'Aubuisson, he said this is part of the country's due legal process, but he again hinted that the ARENA [Nationalist Republican Alliance] deputy was involved [in Msgr Oscar Arnulfo Romero's murder]. He denied D'Aubuisson's charge that the national police and Colonel Lopez Nuila—who was its chief at the time—were involved in Msgr Romero's murder, adding that he will appoint Lopez Nuila as Presidency minister.

In addition, the president said Captain Saravia, said to be the main culprit in the case, could be extradited in 60 days.

[Begin recording] [Duarte, in progress] ... [words indistinct] a 60-day proceeding in the United States for presentation of evidence. Then, after studying the case, the judge will rule whether the extradition request is valid. Therefore, we have to wait (?for it to be presented).

[Reporter] Will Col Lopez Nuila be removed at the end of the year, as Maj D'Aubuisson said?

[Duarte] No, sir. He will not be removed. He will be promoted to the post of Presidency minister.

[Reporter] Is it true that many officers have asked for Lopez Nuila's resignation?

[Duarte] No. It is not true. Some remarks were made some time ago, and several officers reported they thought Col Lopez Nuila was the leader of the [words indistinct] organization for forensic investigations. However, this was not true. The report was mistaken. Col Lopez Nuila has nothing to do with it. [passage omitted] [end recording] [passage omitted]

Honduras

President Azcona Approves Amnesty Decree

PA041555 Tegucigalpa Cadena Audio-Video in Spanish 1130 GMT 4 Dec 87

[Report by Francisco Mejia]

[Excerpt] Honduran President Jose Azcona yesterday approved Amnesty Decree No 197-87 issued by the sovereign Honduran National Congress. [passage omitted]

USSR Official Visits, Discusses Trade Pact

PA082228 San Pedro Sula TIEMPO in Spanish 8 Dec 87 p 11

[Text] Tegucigalpa—According to Yuriy Vislousov, the USSR's commercial delegate for Central America, the bilateral commercial agreement with the USSR will go into effect with the exchange of fertilizers for bananas valued at $1.8 million. Vislousov arrived in Honduras yesterday for a 3-day visit.

Moreover, negotiations are underway to sell between 30,000 and 50,000 tons of brown sugar on the Soviet market.

Vislousov and Economy Minister Reginaldo Panting have started holding a series of meetings with government officials and industry representatives interested in taking advantage of the agreement signed several months ago in Moscow.

The Kremlin's commercial delegate also met with leaders of the Federation of Honduran Agrarian Reform Cooperatives (Fecorah) to begin negotiations on the exchange of bananas for fertilizers.

Vislousov began negotiating a heavy machinery deal with authorities of the Secretariat of Communications, Public Works, and Transportation (SECOPT).

He also met with members of Tegucigalpa's Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and he has scheduled other meetings for today and tomorrow.

Vislousov said that in Honduras the greatest interest seems to be in urea, and he stressed the commercial exchange will help both countries.

He pointed out, however, that "the exchange with Honduras is part of our total trade exchange, and will not substantially alter Soviet commerce. I believe this exchange is more beneficial to Honduras than it is for the USSR. [no closing quotation mark as published]

When asked if the signing of the commercial treaty with Honduras is a political success for the USSR, Vislousov reconfirmed that "both countries benefit."

Meanwhile, Gilberto Goldstein, president of the Association of Sugar Producers, who participated in the Economy Ministry meeting, said negotiations are underway to sell between 30,000 and 50,000 tons of brown sugar to the USSR.

Efforts are being made to get a better price for the product than is received on the international market, to take full advantage of the agreement, Goldstein said.

Nicaragua

Daniel Ortega Comments on Santo Domingo Talks

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[Statement by President Daniel Ortega during "Face the People" program at a meeting with Ortega, Foreign Minister Miguel D'Escoto, Reinaldo Antonio Tefel, Social Security and Welfare Institute minister, and a visiting delegation of the Geneva-based World Leadership Council composed of the World Church Council, the Latin American Church Council, and the National Church of Christ Council; in Managua—live]

[Excerpts] When we insist that a dialogue between the United States and Nicaragua is of great importance and necessary to secure peace, we do not say this to upset U.S. Government leaders. We say it because we are certain this is the only realistic and applicable attitude to obtain peace in Central American once and for all.

The signing of the Esquipulas document in Guatemala on 7 August was a sovereign action of the Central American presidents and a sovereign action of five government leaders who decided to sign a document to seek peace. It should supposedly be respected by other nations even if those other nations are involved in the conflict.

Since the United States is involved in the conflict—and it was involved in it on 7 August—the logical response would have been U.S. respect for the agreement once it had been signed.

The first step the United States should have taken was to state it supported and respected the agreement; or, if it did not want to support it, then it should have said it respected the agreement adopted by the Central American presidents and it was not going to interfere in the agreement's fulfillment. However, the U.S. Government's reaction was the following: It said that the Esquipulas agreement was all right, but it did not include aspects that concern the United States.

Therefore, we are facing a problem that goes beyond what should be respect for the international legal order and respect among nations, whether they be big or small nations. The United States is stating it must impose its decision and exert its influence even against the will of the Central American leaders. This is a very grave aspect because this has not only been words. This has been accompanied by actions such as the U.S. President's request for new funds to continue the war in Nicaragua and the constant threat that if the contras are not financed then tomorrow U.S. soldiers will have to be used, something that would entail a higher cost for the U.S. people. In other words, they are constantly using the threat of invasion.

We set 5 November as the date to implement the agreements; that was an appropriate date for the United States to respect the appeal made by all the Central American leaders to extraregional powers or countries involved in supporting armed groups to stop that support. The best gesture the United States could have made as a sign of respect for the Central American presidents was to declare on 5 November that it was ending all types of aggressive action, support, and financing against Nicaragua. However, that did not happen.

Therefore, even though the Esquipulas agreement is very important, it faces the political will of the U.S. Government, which is not interested in a negotiated solution unless that negotiated solution destroys the process of change taking place in Nicaragua, vanquishes the Nicaraguan revolution, and makes us return to the past forms of domination. That would mean we would once again have the Somozist guardsmen heading the Army; we

would have a minority unwilling to justly distribute wealth and instead would want to seize it; we would have people living in misery and abandoned; and the lands given to the peasants would be snatched away from them by the former Somozist guardsmen.

The contras could even disappear. They could either disappear via military means or by a miracle. The contras could accept the Esquipulas plan; in other words, they could accept a position independent from the U.S. Government. This could happen—we are speaking hypothetically. But even if that happened the problem would continue, because the problem is not generated by the contras, by what we call the contras. There is a tendency to distinguish between the contras and the U.S. Government. The truth is that there is only one contra: the U.S. Government's policy; in other words, a counterrevolution. There were counterrevolutions in France and even in the United States. In all the countries where there has been an independence process there has always been an attempt to turn back that independence process.

Therefore, the counterrevolution is the U.S. Government. It is the current administration. This administration decided to use former Somozist guardsmen as the main tool to attack Nicaragua and then incorporated into those armed actions some people in the countryside through force or pressure while other people joined because of ignorance. That is why the contras are only a tool of a counterrevolutionary policy that is entirely organized, directed, and financed by the United States. That policy uses several tools: lies, slanders, calumny, and the denigration of the Nicaraguan revolution.

This is typical of the U.S. Government. We can expect anything from it, any slander and calumny. We have examples of this. When there is a falling out with military or political leaders who have been good friends of the United States, it starts making all types of charges against them. If such charges are being made now, how is it possible that in the past they were friends and had accepted those people?

I can specifically mention Panama's General Noriega. The U.S. Congress has even gotten involved in actions against the Panamanian Government. Gen Noriega was a good friend of the United States for years. He had good relations with the U.S. Army and the State Department and some say he also had good relations with the CIA. Now he is said to be responsible for a number of crimes. A Panamanian poet recently said the following: What moral authority does the U.S. President and his government have to launch this type of campaign against Gen Noriega when among the U.S. President's closest friends is a great singer whose links with the Mafia are known? I am referring to Mr Frank Sinatra. Therefore, what moral authority does President Reagan have to try to sling mud at Gen Noriega?

Therefore, the United States uses all types of campaigns. It has used them against Nicaragua, saying we persecute religion, we violate human rights, and that terrible crimes are committed against the Nicaraguan people. It has used economic pressure and an embargo against Nicaragua. It has exerted pressure on multilateral organizations to not cooperate with Nicaragua. That happened with the IDB. Four years ago it approved up to $54 million in funds for agriculture and infrastructure for the Nicaraguan people, but the United States has blocked that financing.

The United States uses the contras. It uses its own Army to establish bases in Honduran territory. It uses its own Army in any way. It was recently learned that a general was convicted. He was the one who paid the consequences after it was shown that special U.S. Army units participated in the preparations for the attacks on our ports.

The real problem here is the U.S. Government's political will. As I explained to you, the contras could disappear and the Guatemala City agreements could go into effect, but if the United States does not change its political will, then we will be confronted by the threat of an invasion by U.S. troops. That is why I insist that, simultaneous with the Esquipulas negotiating effort, there must be a direct dialogue between the United States and Nicaragua in which only security issues would be discussed, because the United States claims Nicaragua is a threat to its security. If this is the case, we must address this issue. We are willing to make agreements with the United States that are verifiable by international commissions to ensure security for Nicaragua and the United States.

This is because we undoubtedly cannot pose a threat to the United States; nor have we ever thought of threatening the United States.

The agreement with the Central American countries is to free our national territories of any foreign military advisers, foreign military bases, and any type of foreign military presence.

In other words, none of us should allow any type of foreign military activity in our countries. This would turn Central America into a neutral zone, a peace zone. That is our position, and that is our objective.

But since the United States continues to pursue its plan, even during the Esquipulas negotiations, we are forced to take the United States into account. We feel that if a key point, such as the cease-fire, were discussed at the apostolic nunciature in Washington, this would exert pressure on the administration and would bring Congress and U.S. public opinion into the discussion in such a way that the U.S. Government would have to either seriously consider negotiating a cease-fire or else tell everybody that it is not in favor of peace. In other words, it would have to take off its mask once and for all. And I believe that would be a high political price to pay.

So, it would seem as though, under such circumstances, the United States has to quickly promote a cease-fire because the cease-fire is linked to disarmament, and disarmament is linked to amnesty, and amnesty is linked to the doors that will be opened for the armed groups so they can take their places as political opposition groups. The offer is to have them exchange the armed struggle for the civic struggle. This is the Esquipulas alternative. And in order to take advantage of this a cease-fire must be reached, because the Esquipulas document discusses the holding of talks to arrive at national reconciliation. It states that a dialogue should be held and that to do this mechanisms should be created to allow a dialogue with the opposition groups, in accordance with the laws.

This presupposes the existence of laws in every country. I do not believe there are two sets of laws in each Central American country, one for the opposition groups and one for the government. The laws must be upheld and defended by the governments. The Esquipulas agreement stipulates that the governments will initiate dialogues with the disarmed domestic political opposition groups and with all those who have accepted the amnesty. To accept the amnesty means to lay down arms.

The political dialogue to discuss such matters as justice, freedom, and democracy is a dialogue to be held exclusively with civic opposition groups. What, then, is this door being opened, in accordance with the Esquipulas agreement, to the armed groups?

It is the opportunity to lay down arms, to take part in the dialogue, and to become an opposition political party if they desire, or to join existing opposition parties. This will be their choice.

Here the governments have committed themselves to take all the steps necessary to achieve an effective cease-fire within the constitutional framework. The 11-point document presented by Nicaragua is very flexible; it was carefully thought out so it could become a reality. It was not drawn up for appearances or to go through the motions of complying with the Esquipulas agreement.

Through Cardinal Obando y Bravo we submitted 11 points to the contras. The contra document, logically, was drawn up by the U.S. State Department—even the U.S. news media says this. And this is very important because this will be the topic of discussion during the next few weeks.

For the cease-fire agreement we could have very well sent a delegate to the contras, with a take it or leave it proposal.

By doing this Nicaragua would be complying with the Esquipulas agreement. We have a constitution in this country, and the government has to defend the laws as well as the spirit of the Esquipulas agreement. Our proposal has been made in the spirit of the Esquipulas agreement and within our country's legal framework.

By doing this we have put the contras on the spot. They will say they do not agree with our proposal, but we insist that these are the 11 points and we will stand by them. And in January, at the next meeting of the international commission—which can determine whether Nicaragua's actions were correct or incorrect—we feel certain that the commission will say that Nicaragua has fulfilled its part of the agreement, but the contras did not accept the proposal.

The Guatemalan Government held a meeting with its guerrillas in Spain; no written proposal was submitted, the proposal was made verbally, and the guerrillas accepted it. There was no discussion, the proposal was submitted, and it was accepted.

El Salvador followed more or less the same procedure as Guatemala. The government made a proposal, the guerrillas responded, and talks were held. However, Anaya, the president of the El Salvador Human Rights Commission, was murdered and this affected the process.

This is another problem. If the Central American governments are incapable of guaranteeing the safety of opposition members, or of human rights movements leaders—regardless of how much they denounce the government—if their personal safety cannot be guaranteed by us, then how can we expect the armed groups in our respective countries to enthusiastically accept a proposal to lay down arms, accept an amnesty, and become opposition groups?

The truth is that in countries such as El Salvador and Guatemala, where Presidents Duarte and Cerezo have themselves been victims of criminal actions by extremist paramilitary groups, there can be no control, no matter how much political willingness exists. I believe our control has been effective up to now.

Former Somozist guards men have accepted the amnesty. There was the one who sought asylum in the Mexican Embassy in Honduras. From there he traveled to Mexico and from Mexico he traveled to Nicaragua. He brought his family with him. We are talking about a man who was a Somozist guardsman, a criminal from the days of Somoza who became a counterrevolutionary chief. He told us about his unit. Many people here ask desperately about missing relatives, about kidnapped relatives. This former Somozist guardsman has reported how in fleeing they raped, and afterwards murdered, several unarmed young girls who were teaching people in the countryside how to read and write. The young women protested while they were kidnapped and pushed around. Others, those literacy-providing young women who in terror kept silent, were taken to Honduras where they are kept in some camps in a state of terror.

We have had to protect this criminal—and he is a criminal—from the people because the people are very upset. Some mothers are not too sure, and neither are we, about which girls are dead and which are alive, and

they asked us to be allowed to speak with him and we had to yield. He talked to them but he was so coarse that the mothers broke down in tears and wanted to kill him. But it was necessary to determine which girls had been murdered—so that their mothers' anguish could end—and which are alive, in Honduras.

This means that in Nicaragua we are trying to guarantee these people's lives. This is an important part of the agreements.

The cease-fire is the subject that arouses the most interest. We proposed that the negotiations take place in the United States. The contras said they should take place in Nicaragua or in some other Central American country.

The problem is that the Esquipulas agreement clearly states that the Central American governments cannot give this type of support to rebel or irregular groups. The Esquipulas agreement defines revolutionary movements as rebel groups, and the contras as irregular groups.

Point 5 of the agreement states: To cease assistance to irregular groups and insurrectional movements. The governments of the five Central American states will ask governments, of the region or outside the region, that openly or covertly provide military, logistical, financial, or propaganda aid or personnel, weapons, ammunition or equipment to irregular forces or insurrectional movements, to cease that assistance as a fundamental contribution—it is very clearly stated here—to achieve a stable and lasting peace in the region.

This is a request to governments outside the region and also to regional governments. This point adds: Not included in the above considerations is aid given for repatriation, to relocate people, and to provide assistance to people who belonged to those groups or forces so they may reintegrate themselves into normal life.

This means that if the U.S. Congress is going to approve $3 million for the contras—and this money is managed by the CIA and invested in weapons—it would be better for Congress to approve that $3 million for the International Verification and Follow-Up Commission for use in fulfilling the Guatemala document.

Point 5 adds: They [the Central American states] will ask the irregular and rebel forces operating in Central America to abstain from receiving aid for the sake of an authentic Latin American spirit. This is a fundamental, vital point.

It has been proposed that the first cease-fire discussions take place in the United States and Central America. As the debate ended we did not accept Central America. Besides, if we follow a certain logic, that which applies to Central America applies to the United States because the United States is involved in the conflict. And the debate should not take place in the areas involved in the conflict because negotiations in Central America would not be right. It is one thing for people linked to armed groups to live in a Central American country, to live with their families, etc. It is something else for them to have an office, propagandize, hold meetings, and conduct logistical support activities in that country. That would violate the agreements.

For example, Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, Alfonso Robelo, Alfredo Cesar, Azucena Ferrey, and other members of the so-called contra leadership live in Costa Rica. However, to go to any Central American country to negotiate with them would violate the agreements because we would then be granting them political status if we start negotiating with them in a Central America country, where we are stressing that there should be no activity of this kind by people linked to armed actions.

We proposed to Cardinal Obando y Bravo that he choose another country besides the United States or Central America. He decided on the Dominican Republic, and we agreed.

The meeting was held in the Dominican Republic, with the following problems. The week before last, on Saturday night, I met with Cardinal Obando y Bravo before he left for the Dominican Republic. I explained Nicaragua's position to him, and I gave him a note in which the Nicarguan Government asked the mediator to discuss the following points during the first meeting:

1. That the cardinal be confirmed as the mediator, because there was still some confusion on this point. Nicaragua had already delivered the letter confirming the cardinal, while the contras had not. Then the contras delivered their letter.

2. Nicaragua asked the contras to answer the 11 points that we presented in Washington to the cardinal and that he presented to them in Miami. We wanted their reaction to the 11 points that the Nicaraguan Government presented, in compliance with the Guatemala agreement. At that time the contra proposal was already known. We were asking the contras several questions. This does not mean we were agreeing to discuss their proposal. We merely wanted to clear up two points of their proposal so they could justify them. If they explain them and we find that they are justified, of course we would consider them. However, if they are not justified we could not consider them. That was the fourth [as heard] point.

The next point was to decide on the place. No, the next point was that we told the contras to reply to Speaker Jim Wright's proposal regarding a group of technicians that was to be the cardinal's support team. They then said they did not agree to that proposal.

The next point was to agree on Santo Domingo as the site of the meetings as we proposed. They did not agree to that.

The other point was the meetings' agenda, and the last point was asking the cardinal to give us copies of the minutes of his meetings with the contras.

The Nicaraguan delegation was at our embassy ready to answer any of the cardinal's questions and to meet with him after he met with the contras. Our delegation was ready to discuss their answer. I am getting two times mixed up. One, the time when I met with the cardinal on another point, which is when the contras answered and the cardinal met with our delgation on Friday morning, and when we replied to the contras the next day.

At any rate, the positive aspect regarding the implementation of a cease-fire has to do with the meeting itself. Despite disagreement over the site of the talks, we were quickly able to reach an agreement to go to Santo Domingo, where the meeting was finally held. Once in Santo Domingo our positions were totally different, as should be expected from a process of negotiations, even more when we were sure that the United States would try to kill this effort to agree on a cease-fire, because this would give President Reagan the opportunity in January to say: This has failed, so let us continue seeking more funds for the contras.

In the middle of all this another factor emerged, which you should be aware of because it could lead to wrong interpretations. [pause] I think I gave you the wrong date. The day I met with the cardinal was on Wednesday night. I do not remember what I told you before, but the meeting was on Wednesday night, the night before his departure to Santo Domingo. He left for Santo Domingo on Thursday.

On the previous Saturday, when we still did not know about the contents of the contras' proposal and while Spanish Deputy Prime Minister Alfonso Guerra was visiting us, the cardinal proposed a truce. The cardinal asked me what I though about a Christmas truce, and I told him we had had bad experiences with truces. We once declared a 30-day truce and we maintained it despite continuous contra violations. We maintained it for 30 days. The contras staged heavy attacks against several towns, and they did not stop killing people during the 30 days. So I told him that under such conditions we could not accept a new truce because the contras would not comply with it. If we are complying with the truce and the other side does not, we would then be forced to not comply with it.

So he said we should concentrate on a cease-fire. I told Cardinal Obando y Bravo about El Salvador's experiences with truces. In El Salvador, President Duarte had proposed a truce—I do not remember if it was for 15 days or for a month—but 4 or 5 days later he had to suspend it. It failed. So our past experiences with truces are not really positive. They have been more symbolic than real truces, so I told the cardinal we should not stray away from the main issue, which is the discussion of a cease-fire.

What happened? I told him: If tomorrow, Sunday, you insist and call for a truce, I will accept it. As soon as I am informed you have called for a truce I will accept it. I waited for his Sunday homily. He did not officiate mass at his church; he went to a small town to do it. During his homily he did not mention a truce. On Monday we learned about the contras' proposal. We never thought the contras would make such a proposal. It was a totally irrational proposal. We interpreted it as a means to provoke the Nicaraguan Government to say: We cannot discuss this; they have gone mad; we cannot continue playing like this. Those were the first reactions we had. It was a true provocation.

They spoke about occupying 68,500 square km in the country. If you did not take into account our lakes, which add up to some 10,000 square km, that would be 78,500 square km of 130,000; we would have 80, 40, 50, 113. That is, they would leave us with practically 50,000 square km. [figures as heard]

That is really absurd, so we said: No, this would only worsen things here. We cannot talk about a cease-fire because those people would want to exploit a cease-fire that had been implemented in a 68,000-square-km area, even though no one can verify such a thing. Consequently, we said no.

I met with Cardinal Obando y Bravo again on Wednesday because he was leaving for Santo Domingo on Thursday. He presented the cease-fire proposal and my answer was a definite no. I said: If you had issued this appeal on Sunday I would have accepted it, because it would have been possible. Deputy Prime Minister Guerra and I had waited for a proposal. Deputy Prime Minister Guerra knew about the cease-fire, because he had talked with Cardinal Obando y Bravo, and he hoped positive results would be achieved. Mr (Venetsky) had also met with Cardinal Obando y Bravo and discussed the cease-fire.

Consequently, I said: If you had issued the cease-fire proposal on Sunday I would have accepted it—even if we had to wait until Monday for the contras' acceptance. We would have accepted it because we would not break our pledge. When we say yes, we mean yes.

Well, the contras have now issued a proposal, but it is irrational and provocational. Consequently, there can be no truce; a cease-fire requires a lot of work.

What is our opinion about what happened in the Dominican Republic? First, the contra proposal includes what you might call three parts. These must be handled by different people. There are parts about the number of weapons and soldiers in each country, the presence of foreign advisers and military bases in certain Central American countries, etc. The Esquipulas agreement clearly specifies that this duty has been assigned to the

Central American governments. Article 7 of the agreement refers to negotiations about security matters, verification and control, and limitation of weapons. It says that the five Central American governments, with the Contadora Group as mediator, will negotiate—on points pending agreement—security matters and verification and control. This is the point still pending in the Contadora Group's famous document. The document specifies that the negotiations will also include measures for the surrender of irregular forces that are willing to accept the amnesty. Therefore, this is a task for the Central American governments.

The contras include these points as conditions for a cease-fire. Then they include points about political issues. I already told you these issues can only be discussed by unarmed civic opposition groups and those who have accepted the amnesty. The point that the contras must specifically discuss with the Nicaraguan Government has been... [changes thought] They have practically implied that this is an issue that must be discussed with them, as if they are a government. This means the armed movements in other Central American countries—Guatemala, El Salvador, and even Honduras, where they have a small armed movement—would have the right to demand that the governments of Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala sit down and negotiate what type of army those governments should have and how many military advisers they will have. The document clearly states this topic must be discussed and approved by the Central American presidents.

When they become unarmed they will gain the right to become a political force and the members of the unarmed groups can actively participate in any political party or in a political dialogue if they so desire.

The requirements to reach this goal are: first, cease-fire; after the cease-fire comes disarmament; and after disarmament, or automatically with disarmament—we propose that it is not necessary that anything be signed, but simply whoever is unarmed will automatically be protected by the amnesty. [sentence as heard]

Who will guarantee this? We are not going to invent guarantors because in that proposal they practically create another Esquipulas document. It is another thing. In other words, it is their document, their own version. The contras are shoving aside the agreements made by the five Central American presidents and are creating their own document and their own verification commissions. They do not accept the International Verification and Follow-Up Commission, which would be the guarantor in this case. There are three commissions that are guarantors: the International Verification and Follow-Up Commission, which would guarantee the implementation of the cease-fire and disarmament and ensure that those people would be able to participate in the country's political life; the National Reconciliation Commission, which has already started working and that witnesses and guarantees the compliance of those points; and the mediator himself, with his team, is also a guarantor. All of them, from the international commission to the mediator, can state that Nicaragua is not complying, that it is arresting people who accepted the amnesty, or that it is killing them, or anything if such crimes are occurring. They can determine if Nicaragua is complying. We will be subject to the international commission, the national commission, and the mediator.

Regarding the Dominican Republic meeting: After the contra's response to the question and as the cardinal told us, in conclusion, that he was going to consult with the contras in the Dominican Republic about a truce, I responded: We do not agree with a truce and we will not accept it. [sentence as heard] However, you have the right to ask the contras. You can do anything you want but we cannot encourage it. You can ask them whatever you want, propose whatever you want.

Thus, Obando arrived in the Dominican Republic, presented our proposal, and was left up in the air because there was no advancement toward reaching an agreement on the cease-fire. There are subjects on which we agree: We agree on peace; we agree on Esquipulas II; we agree on a cease-fire. We agreed on general matters concerning four points, but after that our differences stood out: where they were going to hold the meetings, the subject of the technical group, and their not answering our questions, not answering our questions about their proposals. Suddenly, this meeting that should have centered on a cease-fire was given another connotation not covered by the Esquipulas agreements: The subject of a truce becomes the main topic, and a truce continues to be the cardinal's topic.

A proposal the cardinal had not mentioned to me before he left for Santo Domingo—and that I do not know if he had already thought out or if it was worked out when he was talking to the contras—is stated in the document that the cardinal publicly presented in Santo Domingo, in the following manner: First, he states where they met and who participated, he thanks the Dominican Republic Government, etc., and then he goes into the essence. The coincidences between the Nicaraguan Government's and the Resistance proposals are the following:

A. To accept the cardinal as mediator—coinciding point.

B. To wish for peace to avoid greater bloodshed among Nicaraguan brothers—coinciding point.

C. To accept the Esquipulas II agreement—coinciding point.

D. To wish to agree on a cease-fire.

Then the next point. There are great differences concerning the reason for and operational methods to agree on the coinciding points. That is all this point says. It does not give any details on those differences. It only says that.

Then the document goes on to another topic. It says: After deep and balanced explanations and a serene exchange of opinions—after listening to the proposals made by Cardinal Obando y Bravo; the specific observations made by Msgr Carlos Santi, who is a member of Cardinal Obando y Bravo's delegation; and those made by Msgr Bosco Vivas—the Nicaraguan Resistance agrees to negotiate with the Nicaraguan Government; it agrees to negotiate with the Nicaraguan Government [repeats himself] a temporary cease-fire truce, only if the Nicaraguan Government agrees to issue the following decrees simultaneously:

A decree of total and unconditional amnesty for political and common crimes involving political deeds.

B. [No point A as heard] A decree to immediately lift the national state of emergency.

C. A decree of unconditional freedom of radio, press, and television.

In other words, it is a truce with conditions, because usually a truce only has one condition: to halt the shooting during the truce and avoid confrontations. That is what a truce is about.

This point in the document is really a political statement. In this point Cardinal Obando y Bravo relates the process. He states that the contra movement accepts the truce under the condition of... [changes thought] When I next talk to Cardinal Obando y Bravo I am going to ask him to include the Nicaraguan Government counterproposal, because at the meeting with the Nicaraguan delegation Vice Minister Victor Hugo Tinoco told Cardinal Obando y Bravo we would agree to the truce and to implement those points proposed by the contra document if the United States immediately stops all support for the mercenary forces and if the contra camps in Hondruas are dismantled.

Then Cardinal Obando y Bravo says that the contra movement answered they would agree to the Nicaraguan Government proposal if Nicaragua accepts the country's democratization. This whole thing practically meant a negative answer to the truce from both parties. It was a no to the truce because the contra movement proposes a truce imposing conditions. Another point that... [changes thought] The document continues: Through a suggestion, a suggestion made by representatives of the Catholic Church and out of respect for the Nicaraguan people's religious feelings, a truce will be declared; in other words—that is what they proposed—a truce will be declared beginning at 1200 on 7 December until 0000 on 8 December in homage and respect for the Virgin Mary on the day of the Immaculate Conception. In addition, another truce will be declared beginning at 0000 on 22 December until 0000 on 6 January 1988 in homage and respect for the celebration of the birth of Jesus, new year, and the Epiphany.

However, there are small details there. This document says through a suggestion made by the church—so it is the church, the mediator, speaking here. [sentence as heard] Cardinal Obando y Bravo can go as far as that. He can propose that—it is a schedule—he can declare a truce without conditions. However, the contra movement said it will declare a truce, but with certain conditions. Thus, we added some other conditions, and other conditions coming from other sides added up to these ones.

In the end, after the church truce proposal for the aforementioned days, the document continues: Therefore, an atmosphere of peace and serenity will be opened so the aforementioend decrees are fulfilled. Thus, the church would be accepting the conditions presented by the contra movement, and it is not making any reference to the conditions presented by the Nicaraguan Government. The mediator must refer to the conditions expressed by the two parties. It cannot refer only to what one of the parties presents, but to what both parties state. The document continues by saying that a process of negotiating for a cease-fire with the two parties can then begin.

That is really very confusing. It is confusing because all this is like mixing in one single... [changes thought] in what should be a specific topic. In other words, it is like mixing actions that have already taken place, because we granted a pardon here that benefited about 1,000 Somozist guards and contras. We issued an amnesty decree and lifted the state of emergency, so the International Verification and Follow-Up Commission can tell us when to lift the state of emergency and implement the amnesty based on simultaneity. That means that conditions must be complied with by the other side as to the dismantling of the camps and an end of U.S. activities for the commission to say: Well, you can now lift the state of emergency.

We have placed this in the commission's hands, not ours. It is not for us but for the commission to decide. We have shown that we trust the commission because that is what it is there for. As for freedom of the press, that does not have to be decreed because it is a reality in this country. After Esquipulas freedom of the press was completely restored without censorship of any kind. You can confirm this by reading some newspapers or listening to some radio newscasts.

We are concerned now—and I will have to tell the cardinal about this when we meet—because the contras again insist on holding the meeting, the dialogue, the negotiations in Central America. The cardinal proposes that direct negotiations also be held in Central American.

I reminded the cardinal that when there are conflicts such as this one, negotiations are not held in the areas of conflict. Negotiations are held in a country that is not

involved in the conflict. There have been similar negotiations in Geneva, Paris, and many other countries we could name. The only countries in Central America where we could hold the meeting would be Panama—because Panama is part of Central America but it did not sign the agreement, and besides it is a member of the Contadora Group—and Belize, which is part of Central America. Those would be the only two places in Central America where negotiations could be held.

We insisted the talks be held in Santo Domingo as there are facilities there and the government is willing to help, so there is no reason for not holding the talks there. Thus, the site for the talks is still unresolved. Once the site is established, I think this will be very important for stabilizing the process of negotiations for the cease-fire. Meanwhile, there will be much tension.

Another very important point is the cardinal's technical support commission. They [the contras] are not accepting the commission proposed by Speaker Wright. It would not be a good idea for this commission to include Central Americans, particularly if the commission includes the military, the Latin American military.

Latin American governments that have created a democratic opening—for example, Argentina—have been threatened by the military. President Alfonsin this year faced a very serious crisis with the military. There was an uprising; a lack of respect of the country's Constitution, of the president.

Therefore, it is not advisable to involve the Latin American military in this. It would be easier to work with diplomatic officials, but not the military. It would be like working with a U.S. Army delegation.

Thus, one possibility is for the cardinal to try to see how he can form this commission with experts from Europe, Canada, and the Nordic countries. Nobody will doubt these countries' experience. We would trust experts from those countries. Canadian Foreign Minister Clark recently visited here and said he was willing to cooperate as much as possible. They have had experience with Latin America. As Miguel [Foreign Minister Miguel D'Escoto] was explaining earlier, the Canadians participated in one phase of the work.

This is a very important point. I put myself in the cardinal's place, and if we consider the contras' proposal one can have political views, and the cardinal can handle that. [sentence as heard] There are some points of view in there that are more technical, that he cannot handle, and neither can the bishops who accompany him.

Of the questions we asked the contras, we asked some in order to unmask them. We asked them: In the event we accept your control of 68,500 square km, what will happen during the cease-fire with the government, police, and Army authorities who control those 68,500 square km?

The contras do not have any bases here. They are an irregular force, moving from one place to another. They cannot remain in any one place. If any of you would like to visit any place in Nicaragua—you can choose the spot you think is the hottest—we will take you there.

The mere arrival of the Army in a place where the contras happen to be at a given moment is sufficient for them to leave. They do appear in some mountain areas; they do ambush civilian vehicles and military transport vehicles on roads. We asked some questions in this regard, but we also asked questions having to do with technical aspects of the cease-fire they mentioned in their proposals that we did not clearly understand even though we know something about this matter.

I put myself in the cardinal's position and, in the first place, I imagine he will try to resolve this issue quickly. Negotiations are always very complex, and I understand this, but I would like these negotiations to be resolved quickly. However, I know this is not easy, especially since I have been informed of the contras' proposal. The cardinal is faced with these issues, and he does not have a technical support team. He cannot sit down with the other bishops to prepare and discuss the 18,500 square km, weapons, and so on, because these matters must be analyzed by specialists. A technical support commission would allow him to work with greater authority.

He could ask: Here are the Guatemala agreement, a Nicaraguan cease-fire proposal, and a contra cease-fire proposal. With the Guatemala agreement as the point of reference, please tell me if the Nicaraguan proposal, from a general point of view—without going into too many details—is correct and if the contras' proposal is correct, or which part of the contras' proposal is correct; what part can be used to contribute to the cease-fire. Then the other parts can be deferred to the corresponding government by the commission, which has to do this work.

After doing this work and after the commission establishes that this and that point presented by the contras can be starting points for discussing a cease-fire and that this and that point presented by Nicaragua are starting points, and since we have different points of view regarding the operational aspects of a cease-fire, the commission could come to Nicaragua. Prior to this the commission could talk with the contras so they could give details about what they want to say with their proposal, so there is a clear conception of what a cease-fire means. The cease-fire is not a negotiation between two governments, as they present it when discussing the military and weapons matter.

After the commission talks to the contras it will come to Managua and speak with the government. Matters again would be clarified; afterwards, they can visit, with all guarantees, the areas with the most intense military activities. They can visit whatever other place they want to visit. Thus they will have the opinions of the two sides

and experience that will allow them to prepare a report based on the original positions of the government and the contras, on its talks with the government and the contras, and on its field visit. Thus it could produce a document that the cardinal may present to the two sides and say: Let us talk about this; or, it would be advisable to talk about this because I believe it can lead us to an effective and short-term agreement.

I understand that the cardinal is proposing we sit face to face with the contras. He has said he would be there. He has said this. But what will happen if the contras and the Nicaraguan delegation were to meet? They would defend their position, and we would defend ours, and there would be a political discussions without progress. This is why we have resorted to a mediator. When we requested the cardinal's mediation we suggested that a technical support team would be necessary so he could work better. This team would be in addition to the, let us say, support team he presently has to prepare documents and offer opinions, as in the case of the truce proposal, in which some bishops participated. This is one other point that must be cleared.

Making a global appraisal of this Dominican meeting, the positive fact is that the meeting took place. The fact that the two sides decided to go somewhere to discuss subjects through a mediator is a positive gesture. A positive gesture is the fact that the Nicaraguan Government has made a proposal that the Nicaraguan Government believes is realistic, that we prepared thinking like contras, thinking about the areas where they move about so that they have the certainty we are not preparing a trap or an ambush to finish them off.

There is the government proposal and the contra proposal. No matter how crazy a proposal is, it is still a proposal. Problems are never resolved in just one meeting; not at the first, nor the second, nor the third, nor the fourth. That is the truth; we know from experience. Therefore, we must have a little patience, but we must also work to determine the site, so the cardinal may have a technical support team as soon as posible. As long as he does not have the technical support team there will be no progress. We have had problems and we are at a stalemate. We can follow this agenda—excuse me, not agenda but document—drafted by the cardinal at the meeting and seek positive results. That is what must be done. There is nothing more to be said about the cardinal's situation. To achieve peace so as to avoid more bloodshed— this is our will.

To accept Esquipulas II is correct. We would like to remind you of something contained in the Esquipulas II agreement, that the topics related to military matters and security should be handled by the governments, and not by irregular groups. It also says that political topics can only be discussed with unarmed opposition groups and that they will have the opportunity to discuss these topics and give their opinion—ask what they want, demand what they want—whenever the correct process has been followed for a cease-fire, disarmament, and amnesty. Then all these matters can be answered.

We would like to obtain a cease-fire. That would be a very specific matter, because it would be wide-ranging and complete. The Esquipulas II agreement is also wide-ranging and complete. However, we must agree on wanting a cease-fire.

Another matter arose. It was the truce the cardinal included, which had nothing to do with the cease-fire. Well, there was no agreement on the truce. Well, let us sit down and discuss those points on which we agree, which is attaining the cease-fire. That is where the cardinal's team should start working. There is agreement on this specific point—the others are more general and far-reaching, more conceptual. This is where we should start working immediately; we believe this is the most important thing.

Let us prevent a repetition of what happened in the Dominican Republic where the main agreements were discussed for only a few minutes because the contra reply was no, no, no. In five minutes the matters had been discussed. I asked the other side, are there any questions? Their answer was there is nothing to answer and that was the end of that. We do not agree with the commission, and that was that. Then the whole discussion centered around the truce. This sidetracks the purpose of the agreements.

This was a serious occasion. The cardinal was there. The Nicaraguan delegation was there. The contras were going to be there. The Dominican Government had provided the setting. The Venezuelan Government lent an airplane. The Panamanian Government lent another airplane. Really, I believe the cardinal could have exhorted the parties to agree on an unconditional cease-fire on such and such a date. But no, [words indistinct] the truce, an unconditional truce for a certain period. Our position must be considered. The contras said yes. Well, Nicaragua said no, and that is it without giving explanations, and the talks will continue on the cease-fire.

We are going to insist that the contras answer our questions, because we are willing to answer theirs about our proposal. We are willing to answer. However, they do not want to ask about our proposal and they don't want to answer our questions about their proposal.

I would say, basically, that the U.S. Government has been forced to accept its participation in [words indistinct] I have heard him calling the U.S. [words indistinct] I believe this affects even more their administration's policy of seeking aid for the contras. [Passage indistinct] From the time this document was being drafted there was a clear intention of breaking up these talks. They wanted the cardinal to become exasperated and say: I am not going to continue with this because this is going on too long and I am not to going continue with this type of

negotiation; let them find someone else. That would cause us to find another mediator. We would not say no. We would insist and we would look for another mediator.

That is what they want. They want the cardinal to become exhausted, provoke us into saying: Well, these talks are over. We were even tempted to do this when they came up with their proposal. My administration was going to say that this was a provocational act and disrespectful of the Esquipulas agreement and therefore there was no sense in trying to attain a cease-fire, because we did not find any goodwill and it would be a waste of time. We almost did it but we reconsidered and [words indistinct].

We will continue with that effort for a cease-fire even with all the obstacles that exist. However, what is basically affecting this is that there is still no willingness on the part of the U.S. Government to implement the Guatemala agreements. There is no willingness. They are waiting to see time pass. What is the logic of the administration, of the most hard-line sectors? We know that there are sectors in the administration that favor negotiation. What do the most hard-line sectors opposing negotiation think? They think that to the extent that this process is delayed and as long as there are no more results of great impact, it will be shown and they will be able to say that the Guatemala proposal is full of good intentions but that it was not feasible, because it did not include other necessary aspects; that Nicaragua sabotaged the peace plan; and that the $270 million must therefore be approved for the war in Nicaragua. That is the line that, according to what is being said, has more weight there, but since they are confronting international pressure, even from the U.S. Congress, they cannot completely ignore the Esquipulas plan, they cannot avoid participating in the talks.

Forgive me if I have spoken too long, but I think it is very important that all of you clearly realize how Nicaragua views this matter.

One can hear many things from other people. One can have prejudices about a certain person. This might be understandable if one has or had a direct relationship with that person. If one has a direct relationship with a person then one can justifiably think that person is bad. But when one has a negative idea about a person but does not really know that person, one runs a high risk of being mistaken.

There are many experiences in human relations where one has the impression that a certain person has certain defects when seeing that person from a distance and not really knowing the person. However, when one meets that person and gets to know that person well, then one changes one's opinion. One finds certain values one did not see before, because one did not have that direct contact.

Answering the U.S. people—as I did when I visited some U.S. cities and they asked me similar questions—should not really be difficult, because if there is a disinformation campaign—and I believe that is the worst problem in the United States, disinformation—this leads to prejudices about what has happened in Nicaragua.

The moment a Nicaraguan Government representative speaks, anyone listening to him knows he is interested in saying good things about Nicaragua. So, the possibilities of an actual rapprochement by trusting and truly understanding what is happening in Nicaragua through communications similar to what we are doing here today with those who have still not toured this country and do not know this country [words indistinct]. Later, we will go to another place, near the volcano, and this evening we will be able to contact the people.

I do not think that will be enough, even while you are visiting Nicaragua. When I finish making an explanation—because I must make some sort of an explanation when I am asked this type of question—I then invite them to visit Nicaragua. I invite them to visit Nicaragua, but not just for a few hours as the senators and congressmen do. Some senators who have never visited Nicaragua stay here for a few hours, and they then go back to the United States and say: I was in Nicaragua; I was able to verify there is a totalitarian regime there; there is no freedom of religion; there is religious persecution; there is no freedom of the press, as Mr Dodd said. He was here for a few hours. When Dodd came here he already had his speech prepared. He returned to the United States with the same speech.

I invite people to visit Nicaragua. This has been a very positive experience because ever since the revolution's victory thousands of Americans have visited us. We are trying to count the total number of Americans who have visited Nicaragua since the revolution's victory. We have had an open-door policy, even with those who come to talk against the Nicaraguan revolution. Mrs Kirkpatrick has visited us. We have had Republican congressmen visiting us.

Let me tell you an anecdote. When I was in Washington and visited the Vietnam Memorial there was a very small group there—I do not even know who they were—shouting against me and the Nicaraguan revolution. I came up to talk with them. I came closer to one of them, the angriest one, and asked him a question. I asked him: Have you ever been to Nicaragua? He said: Yes, I have been in Nicaragua—he was shouting—I went there with congressman so-and-so. He said: You have no right to be here. He was an aide of Congressman Dornan from California. He said: Yes, I am an aide of Congressman Dornan, and you have no right to be here.

So, how do you like that. He has a right to come to Nicaragua, walk freely in the streets, and demonstrate. I have never done that in the United States; I have never demonstrated in U.S. streets against President Reagan.

But that man who came to Nicaragua with that congressman tried to push me away from the Vietnam Memorial. Six of them came to Nicaragua. They participated in a march with opposition groups who shouted in our streets: Long live the contras; Long live Reagan; Death to Ortega; Death to the government.

The U.S. congressmen marched. They made use of the freedom in this country to voice political feelings. When I am in the United States, however, he wants to deny me the right to visit the Vietnam Memorial. I believe that memorial is a sorrowful symbol in the American people's history. I think no one in the United States wants another Vietnam or another 58,000 American youths dead.

We were looking on this memorial for the name of the father of a comrade who works as my translator in the United States. Her father died in Vietnam. Her father's name is on the memorial. Thus, the experience we have with the thousands of Americans who have come to Nicaragua—or at least with the majority of them who are not politicians, deputies, or congressmen who already have a fixed position or suddenly change their position—is that the vast majority of those Americans are not radical.

There are some Americans who have very radical positions. Among the Americans who visit us are many intellectuals and artists. But the majority of them are citizens just like you. These citizens have been brought over by church groups of various denominations, such as the U.S. evangelical church. [passage omitted]

You know that in the United States one way to try to easily manipulate public opinion is by using the term communism, because U.S. society has been taught that all communists are horrifying and evil. For U.S. society a communist is the same as the devil. I am not saying all of U.S. society thinks that way, but a large part of it does.

You must recall that when former President Jimmy Carter became a true exception in U.S. relations with Latin America—because the other U.S. presidents always wanted to plan the destinies of and rule Latin America—by deciding to reach agreements with Panama for returning the canal to Panamanian hands, he was accused of being a communist. People accused him of being a communist. Ronald Reagan was among those who accused Carter of being a communist. At that time Mr Reagan was among those who accused Carter of being a communist. I do not know to what extent that charge affected U.S. public opinion and to what extent the U.S. people believed Carter was a communist.

There is a time that no one can forget in the United States. It was a time of great persecution. It was the McCarthy era. At that time anyone who disagreed with government policy was a communist, and he or she was tried and sent to jail. Whenever the U.S. leaders have wanted to destroy someone they have always resorted to the same argument.

Thus, instead of giving so many explanations... [changes thought] regardless of the fact that Reagan cannot even justify his policy against Nicaragua, because there is no justification. Nicaragua has never done any harm to the United States—never. On the other hand, the United States has obtained benefits from Nicaragua. It extracted gold and lumber from here. It grew bananas here and took them away. In other words, the U.S. leaders have used Nicaraguan territory to take certain products back to their country. All that was OK with Somoza, all that was OK with Somoza [repeats himself]. The United States did not have to label Somoza a communist because there was a famous phrase by former U.S. President Roosevelt. He used to say: Somoza is a son of a [does not complete phrase], and he would continue by saying: But he is our son, and so we cannot get mad at him.

This only tells us that U.S. policy toward Latin America, including Nicaragua, has been very harmful. [26-second break in reception] The only way to cure these wounds is if the United States has a positive attitude toward Nicaragua. That happened when President Carter decided to struggle for the approval of $75 million in aid. The approval of that money was strongly opposed.

Reagan and the congressmen who opposed aid to Nicaragua at that time are now merrily saying: We, who helped Nicaragua. The truth is they had no desire to help Nicaragua. Former President Carter was willing to help Nicaragua, and he struggled for months until the $75-million aid package was approved. Nicaragua actually received just over $50 million, because some time later the situation changed. However, we never broke off our dialogue with President Carter. We always kept in touch with President Carter, even during the most difficult moments. We maintained good communications to face problems. [4-second break in reception] a premeditated plan in his government platform, but perhaps the U.S. people were not aware of those elements. Perhaps President Reagan only talked to them about economic issues, which are the topics that could interest them the most. Perhaps he explained some aspects of his foreign policy, such as world peace and disarmament, but he did not mention what the platform said about Nicaragua. It clearly said he was going to destroy Nicaragua.

To destroy Nicaragua he needed to win the U.S. Congress' support. To win the U.S. Congress' support he needed to win the U.S. people's support.

The easiest way to get the U.S. people's support was to tell them: The Sandinists are communists. The communists are the same as the devil. Anything done against the devil is fine. I believe, however, the important thing is to promote more visits by U.S. citizens to our country so

they can travel anywhere, so they can meet with groups holding different opinions and opposition groups, and so they can see what the revolution is doing for health and education. Great efforts have been made in this regard. [passage omitted]

It is true we have serious economic problems—more than other Latin American countries because we have to fight the war. Despite this, however, the government is making an effort to provide essential supplies to everyone. Of course, this annoys those who would like to hoard more because there is nothing to do but share the little we have. This is a war situation, and this is how it is. In Europe, for example, during the war, there was great rationing—a lot of rationing, to great extremes. We have not reached those extremes. We guarantee the supply of some basic products, and the other products are available on the free market. Because we have the war and the aggression, we suffer from inflation, which seriously affects the economy, despite our efforts.

The important thing, however, is that thousands of peasants—a great majority of peasants and workers in the countryside who up to 1979 did not know what it was to have some cooking oil... [changes thought] beans, which are a basic staple here, were only boiled. Cooking oil was known only in the cities—it was unknown in the countryside. Rice was seldom eaten in the countryside. If some was eaten, it was simply boiled. Peasants had no sugar, not because they did not want any, but because they could not get any. They made drinks without sugar. We had peasants who, to satisfy their need for sugar, would take corn, crush it, sift it, make a drink out of it, and add a handful of salt to go with it.

After the revolution we established regulations to provide food to all the workers in the countryside that went beyond their wildest dreams. Now it is becoming impossible to comply with these regulations for providing food to these workers, although we want to comply with them. This creates great pressure on the workers, who now feel they have the right to make demands. Before, they had no right to make demands; now they feel they have a right to make demands. The workers did not know what it was like to have meat, but now we have to give the workers meat. Meat was not part of their diet in the countryside.

You see, then, that elections are not the only important thing in the Nicaraguan democratization process. These other factors regarding the effort to lower the infant mortality rate and to ensure education for all—we maintain adult education program in the countryside—also are important. Of course, the war has affected certain things. Doctors and teachers have been killed. Do we just send a doctor somewhere so he can get killed? We cannot send doctors to certain places.

It is good to get to know some of these things, not just by listening to us but by seeing this for yourselves. After all, if I tell you something you could think, no, he is simply exaggerating—perhaps not lying, but exaggerating a bit. There could be another type of visit, one based on this type of meeting. U.S. visitors could arrive here and go on their merry way—anywhere they please. They could talk with the people. They would then leave with a much richer and realistic idea of what Nicaragua is and of the meaning of this revolution. This revolution has a very important element—a new element.

This new element is the revolution's Christian character. What we call Sandinism—the Sandinist revolution—logically stems from the many changes in the world, even including the U.S. revolutionary war, all of which have an influence on the struggle. In addition, the Christian people here joined the revolutionary process and became the creators of and participants in the revolutionary process. This gives a different connotation to the Nicaraguan revolution.

I have talked with some brethren about some topics. I told them that Marx said religion is the opium of the masses but that this has been ruled out in Nicaragua. Here, Christianity is not the opium of the masses, but it is a vital force for changes and spiritual enrichment, as well as for working for a better standard of living for the Nicaraguan people. We want a reasonable standard of living for the people. We do not want wealth but a standard of living that will meet the people's basic needs.

The revolution's Christian character is a very important element. It is important to take it into consideration, because it has created an expectation in Latin America. There is a tremendous Christian force in Latin America. The Latin American peoples are Christian peoples, and they are hopeful about this Nicaraguan revolution. This revolution respects religious beliefs. Any religious group can express itself here. Some of them are somewhat exotic—such as the Bahais—but they have their highway billboards. They can work here, too. [passage omitted]

So this is what I can tell you about the Nicaraguan reality. The most important thing is for the U.S. people to have more direct contact with this reality.

EPS Downs Plane, Captures U.S. 'Mercenary'

PA081239 Managua Radio Sandino in Spanish 1158 GMT 8 Dec 87

[Text] On the afternoon of Sunday, 6 December, a U.S.-made Cessna 162 [as heard], which had violated Nicaraguan air space, was hit by fire from EPS troops in the San Juan del Norte region.

The plane then had to make an emergency landing, and the pilot, a U.S.-born mercenary, was captured.

Major Rosa Pasos, director of the Defense Ministry's Public and Foreign Relations Office, reported this to Radio Sandino very early this morning.

The mercenary pilot has been identified as James Jordan Demby, from Illinois, passport No 022355997. The objects found in his possession directly link Demby to the counterrevolutionaries and to U.S. Government affairs [cuestiones]. We repeat: The objects seized from him link him to the mercenary forces the U.S. Administration finances and directs.

San Juan del Norte port, over which the plane was downed and in which Demby was captured, is on the Nicaraguan south Atlantic, bordering Costa Rica.

Maj Pasos has reported that this morning, Tuesday, 8 December, the mercenary Demby will be presented to the national and international news media.

Humberto Ortega Comments

PA082130 Managua Radio Sandino in Spanish 1810 GMT 8 Dec 87

[News conference held by Defense Minister Humberto Ortega with reporters at the auditorium of the Press and Information Office of the Presidency in Managua—live]

[Text] [Ortega] National and foreign newsmen:

We have called this meeting with the domestic and foreign news media to further discuss—without covering everything, of course—the U.S. man whose plane was forced to make an emergency landing in our territory while it was violating our airspace.

This is the objective of this news conference. Very early this morning we officially announced this event, but we believe it is important to expand, not a whole lot, but at least a little, on what was reported this morning.

We will keep close contact with the domestic and foreign media because in the next few days we will travel to the site where the downed plane is and you will be able to talk with the prisoner at a suitable time. We know that some journalists want to directly question him. We think it will be possible to do this soon. It will not be possible today but it soon will be.

We have to point out that what was announced by our Public and Foreign Relations Directorate early this morning has been fully confirmed by the various objects found in this mercenary's possession and by some statements he has made in the initial interrogation.

The activities of the intruding plane that violated our airspace, the documents that the pilot had in his possession, plus his initial statements have confirmed what we announced early this morning: we said this man has direct links with the U.S. Government activities against our people carried out by the mercenary forces. This is one thing we can confirm with certainty.

This is the U.S. passport that identifies the mercenary as James Jordan Demby, born 12 January 1930. This is the U.S. passport, as you can see. The passport indicates that Demby was active throughout Central America and the United States. Very active. He probably has another passport but this is the one he had when he was taken prisoner. Afterwards, when the news conference is over, you will have the opportunity to take pictures of the passport and to examine it closely. There will be no problem with that.

We will also show you the mercenary's flight log. We will show you the Costa Rican version of the flight log and the U.S. version. In other words, he has one in Spanish and another in English. The English version contained a little bag and we do not know yet what its contents are. We are going to have a laboratory test it to see what it is.

We also have some air control documents provided by Costa Rica. This Cessna has a Costa Rican registry No 282777. You will be able to see it here later. It was issued recently: on 19 July 1987. It is valid until 19 July 1988.

The Costa Rican authorities issued the documents. There is also a photo of the man with a member of the Costa Rican Rural Police. Regarding the photo, we want to point out we have also seized a number of color negatives. We did not have time to develop them because it was early in the morning, but they are being developed right now. There are many negatives; we have some here, see? The negatives show mercenary camps and a mercenary helicopter. Once we have developed the negatives you will be given copies of the photos. We will leave them here in case anyone wants to examine them closely.

This man also brought some military insignia, and he is being questioned about this right now. He brought several military insignia, see? Here is an eagle, some stars, see? He carried several military insignia, and he probably brought them for his buddies. Another important thing: The material proving his links with the enemy's activities against our country includes an identification card that reads: Department of Minerals, State of Illinois [preceding six words in English]. This identification card authorizes him to use explosives. He also had a number of cards like the ones Hasenfus had. You will undoubtedly be able to investigate this even quicker and find out what the information represents; some addresses are handwritten. The most interesting card deals with the import and export of weapons; it reads: Douglas Reisdell, Military Hardware [preceding two words in English]. I do not know; I do not speak English very well. This is another card he carried. Here is another card referring to his activities as a pilot, and there is another one; we do not know what it means yet, but we will show them to you anyway. That takes care of the minor things. We will now continue with the rest.

This man is a native of Carlinville, Illinois, and he once served in the U.S. Army. He went to Costa Rica in 1973 and, together with other U.S. citizens who have settled near the Nicaraguan border, comprised a group they call the Illinois ranchers, who are essentially anti-Sandinists. He has declared himself an anti-Sandinist and anticommunist Republican. He also has stated that the war being waged against Nicaragua is his war. This man is closely linked with John Hull; everyone knows he has a farm in Costa Rica, and the CIA and the U.S. Government have used it to support the aggression plans against Nicaragua.

We have a magazine published in 1984, called FARM JOURNAL [name in English], and John Hull's picutre is on the cover, see? If you approach the table you will see the magazine has an article practically dedicated to our prisoner, meaning Demby, James Demby. The article says Demby's farm is used as a springboard, a platform for the aggression against Nicaragua.

The whole article talks about Demby. There are several pictures of Demby's farm where we see approximately 30 armed mercenaries who met at Demby's farm—that is what we see in this picture. In this article Demby points out that approximately 1,000 mercenaries met at his farm one time. You will also be able to closely examine those pictures.

In addition, there is a picture of three U.S. citizens including Demby on the right, John Hull on the left, and another U.S. citizen whose last name is Bell in the middle. He is also part of that famous group of anti-Sandinist ranchers, who claim to be fervent Republicans fighting the Nicaraguan Government. They own land or farms strategically located on the banks of the San Juan River.

The farm owned by the prisoner is located on the banks of the San Juan River in the Las Crucitas area, where several Costa Rican civilian guards were killed some time ago. At that time people tried to blame the Nicaraguan Government for those murders. Thus, the link between those U.S. citizens and the mercenary forces is clearly established along with their connection with past acts of provocation, which have been carried out to set the Nicaraguan Government against Costa Rica.

There is also a photocopy that Demby had on the plane with him. You will also have a chance to closely examine it. It is a photocopy of the Costa Rican official land register, which indicates the exact borders of Demby's farm, which directly overlooks the San Juan River, which is the border between Nicaragua and Costa Rica. That is the Costa Rican official land register document.

Demby also had an air navigation map on the plane. Here there is, there is [words indistinct] to show you where Demby's farm is located, more or less. This is the map he had on the plane. On this map he marked the location of his farm. This one here. There are names of other farms as well. He also indicated the location of John Hull's farm, which is further inland. It is a whole network that those U.S. citizens have been setting up basically with John Hull's support.

Among those U.S. citizens, he [Demby] stated he is connected with John Hull, who is also a pilot and a farm owner in Costa Rica. He also said that he met (Tom Potei). (Tom Potei) was a U.S. mercenary who was killed when we downed a contra helicopter in Santa Clara in Nicaraguan territory. He belonged to the civil and military assistance [preceding four words in English]. We downed that helicopter in 1984, in 1984 [repeats himself].

Demby also said he knows a U.S. retired colonel named (Karl Kolnik), who lives in Costa Rica, and that he also knows Frank Bell—who is in the aforementioned picture—(George Willington), and Jaime Hamilton. All of them own farms in Costa Rica. Demby states that he also knew (Phil Hawk), who used to be the political officer at the U.S. Embassy in Costa Rica a few years ago. U.S. citizen Richard MacReynolds is the current administrator of the farms, because some of those U.S. ranchers spend most of their time in the United States and occasionally visit Costa Rica. Few of them spend most of their time in Costa Rica. One of those who does is John Hull, who has practically settled in Costa Rica in accordance with CIA plans.

Thus, among other things, the aforementioned details are elements confirming the anti-Nicaraguan position of this prisoner in accordance with the U.S. war of aggression against our country. In addition, we have a draft letter supposedly supporting John Hull. In this letter, we see the important links of our prisoner with John Hull, who we all know is fully connected with the aggressive plans against Nicaragua. He, what is this guy's name? No, the prisoner here, what is his name? James Demby, right. Well, James Demby points out that John Hull, who has always had a very responsible position in Costa Rica, who has always fought for noble causes—in this case against Nicaragua—could not be connected with drug trafficking.

Among the documents found on the plane, there is also a summons that reads: United States district [preceding three words in English] [words indistinct] issued by the U.S. Department of Justice. This document is connected with drug trafficking. So we also found these documents there and the aforementioned draft letter handwritten by the prisoner. According to this letter, Demby can guarantee that John Hull is not involved in drug trafficking. [Passage indistinct] In the letter Demby says that a man who is involved in noble causes such as the war against Nicaragua cannot be involved in those activities.

In addition... [changes thought] Oh, we will leave that for last. We also found a little notebook with notes written by Demby. Among other things he speaks of a meeting between Adolfo Calero and John Hull. It seems Demby

himself also participated in that meeting that took place at a certain time. Thus, in this notebook there is proof of Demby's knowledge of active links with the mercenary forces.

We have not finished looking into this notebook, but we will bring more important things to you.

There are also notations he made by hand. Here is one showing the San Juan River and some camps the contras used some time ago. It is also worthwhile noting that this paper, which mentions arms and weapons, also mentions several names, such as John Hull; [words indistinct] Cuban, meaning from Cuba; (Phil Hunt); and names such as these. There is another paper, the dirty one, which is also here and has several strange notations and signs, such as James Demby. This paper belongs to him. An important fact is that the two papers mention Father Miguel D'Escoto. It even appears to mention Maryknoll missionaries, because there are the letters MM, Miguel D'Escoto, which means Maryknoll missionaries. Apparently, this is attributed to one of these mercenaries for some specific plot against Father D'Escoto. This is what we gather. We did not say at the beginning that Father D'Escoto was mentioned to [words indistinct]. We will go deeper into this when we interrogate this individual.

Also, this small paper here, right? What is this? This paper got torn, right?

What is interesting here is that several contra camps are mentioned, such as Tiricia, Tango, Cisne, La Penca, Purgatorio, Zeta, Delta—until the string ends in San Juan del Norte, where he was shot down. On the Costa Rican side we have here Boca de San Carlos; San Carlos; Taller, which is a contra camp on the Costa Rican side; Sarapiqui; and Barra de Colorado. These names were included in his notes.

All this confirms the prisoner's strong involvement with the war of aggression against our people.

We also have here a letter from a U.S. congressman. The letterhead says U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Washington. Here is the letter. This congressman's name is Richard J. Durbin, a member of the Congress. There are some hand notations by Durbin about this prisoner. According to what we have determined, this mercenary caught this congressman unawares by asking for a letter addressed: to whom it may concern, to avoid any future trouble for himself in Nicaragua, because he was posing as a farmer. This man visited Durbin, who is a congressman from Illinois. Because this man is also from Illinois, and supposedly a farmer, he asked this congressman for a letter so the Sandinists would leave him alone when he sailed along the San Juan River. Apparently, the congressman was taken unawares. We have learned that this congressman has taken up positive stances regarding the current U.S. Administration's unjust war of aggression against the Nicaraguan people. This congressman has even voted against this U.S. Government policy. This is why we think this is a trick, that this man caught the congressman unawares and had him given him this letter. This is our only explanation for this. We will leave this letter here so it can be examined. This is fundamental. This manipulation against this U.S. congressman is part of the method and style of the criminal and dirty war the United States wages against our country.

We also have here a circulation permit issued by the Costa Rican civil aeronautics authority to this James Demby. We also have here a communication issued by the Nicaraguan civil aeronautics authority certifying that this aircraft violated our airspace while operating for the enemy. We think it possible that this individual, as he had done on other occasions, surveyed the Atlantic coast. He himself said he landed on Honduran territory, at a place where he had not been permitted to do so, the port of Lempira. The Hondurans, because they were familiar with his activities, did not detain or punish him. Later, without permission... [changes thought] He had asked for permission, but we had denied it to him and asked for more information. Of course, now we realize he asked for the permission as a cover for his activities and acted without any authorization, branzenly violating Nicaraguan airspace. He crossed Honduras and flew nearly 500 km—this is the length of the Atlantic [words indistinct]—to San Juan del Norte, where a marine company we have stationed there, among other forces transferred from the Atlantic area, opened rifle fire on his aircraft. The fire hit the plane's fuel tank, forcing him to make an emergency landing. We are searching the area of the landing because we have to consider the possibility of his dropping some weapons or packages—which could have revealed his activities—when he was looking for a site to land on the coast.

You can also note this individual's number of flights as noted in his logbook.

At this point everything indicates that he has been involved in espionage or reconnaissance activities ever since he entered the country. We must recall that this kind of small plane is often used for close-range reconnaissance of certain targets because larger planes are more easily detected by radar.

As you might recall, a small plane successfully fooled radars in the Panama Canal Zone. Small planes are used in famous cases such as the Mathias Rust landing in Moscow and elsewhere. Those small planes are appropriate for this kind of espionage activity. In this case we detected it and hit it. I brought a short 6-minute videocassette showing our units capturing this man, this mercenary. He was brought to Managua yesterday, is that correct? That is, his plane was downed Sunday at about 1500, at about 1500, correct?

Yesterday he was brought before State Security. That is what the videocassette shows. We wish to make it clear that he was captured there and that he is now under investigation.

[Announcer] This is Radio Sandino broadcasting directly from the auditorium of the Presidency of the Republic's Press and Information Office in Managua. Right now we see an EPS soldier escorting the U.S. mercenary after his small plane was downed. They arrive at a peasant house.

[Ortega] He is the one wearing civilian clothes.

[Announcer] The video now shows the small Cessna plane. This video is being viewed by the domestic and international press in this auditorium. Here are the clips showing the emblems exhibited by Army General Humberto Ortega. We are viewing paper currency of various denominations—colones and lempiras—and personal belongings, as well as emblems found on U.S. mercenary James Jordan Demby.

This is Radio Sandino broadcasting live. We now see a document identifying the mercenary; one of the several identification documents shown to the domestic and international press. A U.S. [words indistinct] license is now shown as well as other documents he carried when his plane was downed by the Sandinist troops' antiaircraft artillery.

This is another shot of dollars and other paper currency found. Flight instruments, documents, leather bags, and two compasses, other [words indistinct] apparatus, and a communications radio are shown. The video now shows mercenary Demby with his hands tied behind his back and combatants gesturing him to walk.

[Ortega] We could replay this later for those who wish to take pictures after this viewing. We could give copies to some of you [words indistinct] to allow you to see.

[Announcer] The final portion of this video shows the combatants walking with the U.S. mercenary with his hands tied behind his back. He is being escorted by EPS combatants into a vehicle. A combatant is now explaining how they captured the mercenary. The video presentation has ended at the auditorium of the Presidency's Press and Information Office.

[Ortega] We could view it again after we finish.

[Reporter] Did he carry money?

[Ortega] No, he did not carry a lot of money; he carried $200. We will now answer some questions. Here, in the front row.

[Reporter] General, please tell us what his flight plan was. What did he say when he was captured? What was he doing?

[Ortega] As for his route, he was heading from north to south. Supposedly, he came from the United States via Mexico, Belize, and Honduras to Pavas, the (Tobias Bolanos), in Costa Rica. That was his general flight plan. That was his route... [changes thought] He is still being questioned. We will know the exact route later.

However, the route shown on the flight plan is the one I mentioned. [Words indistinct] no permit to fly over Nicaragua.

[Reporter] The video shows the plane at a beach; the sea is seen in the background. Did he land on the beach?

[Ortega] Yes, he did.

[Reporter] This means he was flying over the beach and the sea when the plane was hit?

[Ortega] He was flying over our airspace and territory.

[Reporter] Was he flying over Nicaraguan territory?

[Ortega] Yes, because otherwise it is difficult to reach the plane [with antiaircraft fire]. It is difficult to reach it if the plane is too far [over the ocean]. He maneuvered the plane when the fuel tank was hit—he said he feared an accident because he was carrying little fuel—he saw no other option than landing on that large beach. That is why he landed on the beach.

[Reporter] Was he flying directly from the Honduran border along...

[Ortega] That is correct; from Honduras.

[Reporter] Along the entire coast?

[Ortega] Yes, he flew over a portion of the territory—I will show you his own testimony—he flew over national territory and, at times, he also flew over the coastline.

[Reporter] Commander Ortega, has the aircraft been inspected to determine whether it was carrying hidden cameras or some such thing?

[Ortega] We are now in the process of inspecting the aircraft carefully to determine whether it was carrying concealed equipment. This is being done.

[Reporter] I understand this is the fourth airplane piloted by U.S. pilots that has been shot down.

[Ortega] Yes, this has occurred on several other occasions.

[Reporter] Commander Ortega, has the U.S. Government released any type of official communique concerning this mercenary's capture?

[Ortega] The United States knew from the beginning that the aircraft was missing, because this was reported by civil aeronautics offices throughout Central America, and the gringos are always aware of everything that

happens. But they did not say a word because, of course, they knew that this man was directly involved in covert CIA operations and so forth. This is our understanding of the situation: they remained silent so as to not tip their hand by issuing a statement. In other words, it never concerned them that this was an allegedly normal U.S. citizen.

At no time did the U.S. authorities bother to enlist the Nicaraguan authorities' aid to look for that U.S. citizen. Not a single U.S. official did this. And from the beginning we felt this was very suspicious, and we wondered, why do the gringos not mention this? And then, later, when we were able to seize this individual, and we realized the whole scope of what he is carrying—and I am sure many things will come to light—then it became clear why the United States did not say a word. The United States knew this plane might have been downed because it was constantly flying missions against our country, so not a word was said about it.

Then, as soon as we revealed what had happened, very quickly the mercenaries' spokesmen, and the State Department spokesmen, hastened to say they were not involved in this, that they do not employ U.S. pilots. In other words, they have tried to separate themselves from their clear responsibility in the action against Nicaragua that we are all witnessing.

[Reporter] Commander, my first question is, how come you had a camera there? And, second, what are your plans for the pilot? Is there a possibility that he might be released, as Hasenfus was, before Christmas?

[Ortega] About the camera that you saw, this was because the chief of the Navy happened to be in the area on another mission, so we contacted him and we sent Major Mojica. They have cameras there. We have issued Beta movies [preceeding two words in English] and other such equipment to the various military regions so they may rapidly film any type of situation that might arise.

When the Bluefields comrades arrived in San Juan del Norte they filmed what you saw. That is why it has been documented on film.

As to your question, as to whether or not he is going to be released soon, that depends on our country's laws. The laws must be carried out. While the mercenaries on the one hand are desperately seeking a truce because they are being defeated by our constant harassment, on the other hand they continue to carry out their aggression against Nicaragua. As I said, our country's laws will determine that. In our opinion, that is, in the opinion of the Army and the Interior Ministry, such individuals should be harshly punished, in accordance with Nicaraguan laws.

[Reporter] What was the date of the first flight listed in the flight log, and when did most of the flights listed there take place? Second, when did he request permission to fly over Nicaragua?

[Ortega] On 4 December. But they [not further identified] did not wait for Nicaragua's answer. We request that you send us the following information: aircraft to be used, estimated time of entry into Nicaraguan airspace, and reason for the flight, so that we can process your request. [sentence as heard]

They never sent what we requested. That is, the pilot did not, and he proceeded to violate our national air space. We have called this conference as a courtesy to newsmen.

The comrades in charge of security are still working on all the details. But you will be able to see everything when it is brought here to us; you will be able to take photos and see everything. There is a lot of activity regarding this matter.

[Reporter] I gather from your words that the pilot can be charged with having violated Nicaraguan airspace and having links with counterrevolutionary groups. What are the exact charges against him, and in what type of court is he going to be tried, the TPA's [Anti-Somozist People Tribunals] or another type of court?

[Ortega] That is not my field as chief of the Army; the proper authorities in our country will determine the procedure to be followed. In my opinion, it may be something similar to the Hasenfus case. I really do not know. There has been an obvious violation of Nicaraguan airspace and clear-out activity against our country, an attack on our country's security; and this is clearly linked with all the actions of the CIA and mercenary forces against Nicaragua. In the next few days we should know what procedure will be followed.

[Quinonez] I am Quinonez from ABC Network. In your opinion, what was this man doing here? Was he spying; was he carrying weapons?

[Ortega] I will be able to answer that later, once the security comrades who are currently... [changes thought] A whole process of questioning and investigation is beginning, so it would be untimely to say anything categorical, but it is evident that he was not playing Santa and bringing presents for Nicaraguan children. From his earlier behavior and his links, it is obvious he was on an enemy mission, against our country. I can affirm that.

[Gold] Commander, I am David Gold of Radio Canada, BBC of London. I have two related questions. First: Did you know this gentleman's links before downing the plane? Second: Will any other small planes violating Nicaraguan airspace have the same luck that this gentleman's plane did, regardless of its links with the contra movement?

[Ortega] If any other plane violates Nicaraguan airspace, especially near conflictive or sensitive areas connected with the war of aggression against our country, unfortunately it runs the risk... [changes thought] although it is lost if we do not get any communication in time. If we have contact with the plane during other occasions in which planes having some kind of trouble have contacted us, there is no problem.

In sensitive areas... [changes thought] You know that in the past our enemies tried to set up a big show in San Juan del Norte. They wanted to pretend they were freeing some territory there. There were confrontations and deaths there. As a result of the decline and clear, irreversible, strategic defeat of the mercenary forces, I would dare say that our comrades had not shot one bullet for months there; so when they saw this plane overflying the area in a completely abnormal way they decided to shoot it down. The truth is that it was a very fair decision, because now we have captured this big shot. I do not think the same thing would happen in the rest of the country, if the plane can communicate with us in time. There have been other similar situations, and we have had no problems. What was the other question?

[Gold] Did you know this gentleman's links before downing the plane?

[Ortega] To be clear here, we have been learning more about the situation of these individuals. We knew that... [changes thought] We had [words indistinct] of recognition through the work of our intelligence department and public sources, because even this magazine you saw a while ago is a public magazine in which our prisoner is implicated in attitudes inclined to enemy activities. However, we did not have evidence concerning this individual like the evidence we found. We found it just now.

[Alvarez] Oscar Alvarez of Radio Sandino. Commander Ortega, did you find another person in the downed plane? How does this incident affect the Central American peace proposal?

[Ortega] Because of our quick actions there was no one else in the plane. [sentence as heard] When the plane made its emergency landing our units were close by, and I think the way our units surrounded the plane when it landed was already explained. Thus, it seems there was no one else there. We would have already found some trace. In any case, we are still combing the area, but mainly to see if the prisoner threw some other things out of the plane, especially personal weapons.

Concerning Esquipulas and all those things, we have already stated there is no peace here. In Nicaragua and in the region, as long as Reagan maintains the war process he has supported there will be no peace. The Nicaraguan people are attempting to achieve peace, and that effort is supported by our youths'and people's determination to take up weapons to defend the homeland and the revolution from this criminal war to which we are subjected.

This incident simply proves that the United States has not changed its adventurous policy against our homeland and that our people must be increasingly prepared to carry out a greater mobilization in the coming months to try to destroy the criminal mercenary forces that are already strategically destroyed.

[Zelaya] Mario Zelaya of La Voz de Nicaragua. This captured mercenary had documents directly linking Costa Rican Government officials with certain activities. By coincidence, the Costa Rican Government just allowed the mercenary elite to hold an assembly in that country. How is this viewed now that the Esquipulas II agreement is being implemented?

[Ortega] There has been a true effort on the part of the Costa Rican Government to contribute to Esquipulas II, but these incidents prove we still need greater efforts to completely neutralize the activities often carried out behind the back of the Costa Rican authorities within Costa Rican territory, especially military and cooperative activities. We are not even mentioning that clown or political meeting being held at the Balmoral Hotel in Costa Rica by those who are defeated and who, because of their defeat, want to impose conditions on us, we who are the winners, the Nicaraguan people.

That is similar to what Daniel Ortega said the other day. When the Soviets arrived at the entrance of Berlin with Konev and Zhukov, Hitler felt defeated and gave an ultimatum to the Soviets. The same thing is happening with the contras who are carrying out those clowning activities in Costa Rica.

[Reporter] Commander, I am [name indistinct] from ABC radio. I have two questions. First, what is the physical condition of Mr Demby? Second, what did he do when he was captured? In other words, was he sad or mad? Did he put up a fight or something?

[Ortega] They told me that he knelt down just like Hasenfus and kissed the ground. Like all those captured mercenaries, this individual became a gentle lamb claiming he had not done anything wrong.

Demby's health is fine. He is, of course, tired from all his adventures in the jungle, but he is fine so far. Our comrades of State Security use adequate methods to prevent people from becoming ill. It is not as the propaganda says. Obviously, he was terrified when he was captured, and his morale is very low. He thought that our comrades were going to kill him. However, although our comrades have been stationed in that distant part of the country for such a long time, they have very strong discipline and they know how to act in those cases. It would be dangerous to act in an unruly way.

I would like to conclude by saying the consulate has requested access to this prisoner, but we must tell them that they will have access to him in due time, and the Foreign Ministry will inform them as to when they will be allowed access to him. Meanwhile, the ones who have access to the prisoner right now are the Nicaraguan people and us through State Security. We can meet with the prisoner as often as we wish because he is in our hands.

[Question indistinct]

[Ortega] That is classified by the authorities.

RN Renews Board of Directors, Approves Program
PA090110 Panama City ACAN in Spanish 1630 GMT 8 Dec 87

[Text] San Jose, 8 Dec (ACAN-EFE)—The Nicaraguan Resistance (RN) assembly renewed its board of directors and approved a "government program" to take power "when the Sandinists depart because of votes or bullets."

This information was relayed by the meeting's secretary, Fernando Rappacciolli, after the meeting ended today. The meetings were held for the past 3 days in San Jose.

Details of the government program have not been given because it must still be revised for style, but it was stated it is "absolutely democratic and pluralist" and takes into account all Nicaragua's needs to face the present world.

The conservative Jose Medina Cuadra, who lives in the United States, was elected president, replacing the liberal Alfredo Sacasa.

The rest of the board is comprised of Dolores Turner, first vice president; Mario Melendez, second vice president; Silvio Arguello, third vice president; and Wilfredo Montalban, secretary.

Donovan Braudigan occupies the post of deputy secretary; Socrates Mora, treasurer; Carlos Martinez, treasury official; and Enrique Sanchez, committee member.

Medina Cuadra stated that among his priority objectives were to attain the support of the world parliaments and to take the message of unity, democratic vocation, and need for Nicaraguan liberty to the Latin American parliaments.

Referring to what is fundamental to attain liberty and democracy for his country, Medina noted the need to promote a true unity among the anti-Sandinist sectors and take the initiative in the political field with the opposition's full participation against the government, both in Nicaragua and in exile.

The RN assembly did not discuss Costa Rican President Oscar Arias' proposal for a truce from 7 December (yesterday) until 15 January 1988.

However, it did ratify their support for the cease-fire proposal made by Cardinal Miguel Obando y Bravo last Friday in the Dominican Republic.

The cardinal suggested a suspension of military actions 7-8 December, and another one from 22 December 1987 until 6 January 1988 "in homage to the birth of our lord, Jesus Christ."

The Catholic Church leader proposed to the Nicaraguan Government that, simultaneously with the cease-fire, they decree a general amnesty, reestablish full freedom of expression, and cancel the state of emergency in force since March 1982.

At the RN's assembly, the fourth to be held during 1987, 54 delegates participated, representing the Independent Liberal, Constitutional Liberal, Conservative, Social Christian, and Social Democratic Parties.

The Southern Opposition bloc, a labor group, an agriculture group, and a group from the Atlantic Indians also attended the meeting. Donovan Braudigan, representative for the Atlantic Indian people sector, was elected deputy secretary of the directorate.

Panama

Diaz Herrera, 7 Others Plead Guilty at Hearing
PA081308 Panama City Televisora Nacional in Spanish 0005 GMT 8 Dec 87

["Special bulletin"]

[Text] The first session of the trial of retired Colonel Roberto Diaz Herrera and seven others was held today under tight security. The session was presided over by Judge Albino Alain of the 8th District. The session lasted 20 minutes because the eight defendants pleaded guilty to the charges against them; that is, plotting against the state. The session marks the end of the process that began on 27 July. Jose Alvarez Cueto was the eight defendants' lawyer, and Rosa Elvira de Contreras was in charge of the public prosecution. In addition to Col Diaz Herrera, the hearing was attended by Francisco Nunez Portillo, Gabriel Enrique Pinzon Pineda, Javier Degazo Villanueva, Zoroel Diaz Herrera, Jorge Adrian Caceres Ortega, Alberto Javier Cubillas Mendoza, and Gregorio Escobar Morales.

Judge Albino Alain said the ruling will be handed down in 10 days, in accordance with the penal code. The defendants' relatives were also allowed to attend the hearing. Our cameraman Rene Espinoza was able to get exclusive shots of the event, which show all defendants are in good health and physical condition. Once the judicial procedure concluded the defendants were again taken to the Modelo Jail, while their relatives watched as they were taken out through the court's back door. Jose Alvarez Cueto, the defendants' lawyer, made the following statement:

[Begin recording] [Alvarez] This concludes the procedures of the case. The judge must now issue a ruling—either an acquittal or a sentence—according to his evaluation of the evidence, given that most of the defendants accepted the charges in a praiseworthy act of patriotism and self-sacrifice. I believe they acted in a patriotic way given the difficult situation in the country. Col Diaz Herrera reasserts his... [changes thought] he said he made those statements immediately after being removed from his post and retiring from the Defense Forces, and he added that he was in an unusual mental state. According to Col Diaz Herrera this was not appropriate behavior because he is well aware of the state institutions' strength, given that he was part of the government for such a long time—particularly in the Defense Forces—and he affirms he did not seek to oust the government.

[Reporter Tomas Cupas] In this session did he reassert that the charges he made against General Noriega are groundless?

[Alvarez] That is correct. That is his own interpretation. That is correct. That is his own interpretation about his mental state when he made the statements. His statement was given freely during the trial. [end recording]

Likewise, Judge Albino Alain referred to the court session and the procedures that follow:

[Begin recording] [Albino] The usual procedures were followed. When the session began he was first asked... [corrects himself] he and the others were asked if they were guilty of the crime for which they were being tried, and they answered affirmatively. The judicial code allows 10 days for issuing a ruling.

[Reporter] What kind of sentence will they get?

[Albino] They were accused of plotting against the state. This charge involves six to eight articles. Each article calls for a different sentence, so we will determine exactly which article applies in their case. [end recording]

Liberals Vote To Continue With UNADE

PA082126 Panama City Televisora Nacional in Spanish 0000 GMT 8 Dec 87

[Report by special correspondents Hector Donadio Carrillo and Nivaldo Tejeira]

[Text] The Liberal Party's special national convention decided yesterday in Penonome, capital of Cocle Province, that they will continue as allies of UNADE [National Democratic Union] and will continue to participate and collaborate with the government presided over by Eric Arturo Delvalle. The Liberals of the red flag restructured their political organizations and elected Rodolfo Chiari De Leon president by acclamation. Chiari De Leon is the present government and justice minister.

The 250 delegates who met at the United Penonome Women's Hall reinstated nine members who had been expelled, including Chiari De Leon, Carlos Orillac, Mario Luis Pitti, Targidio Bernal, and Dario Gonzalez de la Barrera, with the approval of the discipline tribunal.

Neither Dr Roderick Esquivel, who was the Liberal Party's president up to yesterday, nor his followers attended the special national convention in Penonome. Nevertheless, the new members of the Liberal Party's National Executive Committee called all the dissident members to return to their political organization.

New Liberal Party President Rodolfo Chiari De Leon thanked all the delegates for their support and noted:

[Begin recording] We are very happy. I believe today marks a turning point in the history of the Liberal Party. Sincerely, we are very happy. [end recording]

In the 1984 elections the Liberal Party only received 28,580 votes and a legislator for Cocle Province; two mayors, also for Cocle; 34 corregimiento representatives; and 4 deputy legislators.

Commerce Minister on Mission to Libya

PA082231 Panama City Televisora Nacional in Spanish 1730 GMT 7 Dec 87

[Text] Commerce and Industries Minister Bernardo Cardenas knows nothing of the reported future visit to Libya by the planning and economic policy minister to reactivate a trade agreement between that country and Panama.

[Begin recording] [Cardenas] Trade agreements come under the Commerce and Industries Ministry, so I do not know what the planning minister's mission to Libya could be. It cannot be a commercial or trade mission, because this comes under the Commernce and Industries Ministry.

[Reporter] What effects have the measures taken by the U.S. Government had on Panamanian business?

[Cardenas] Of an immediate nature, there has been the suspension of the programs financed either with AID loans or donations. The medium-term effects still cannot be established, because it is not a definite or pemanent measure. [end recording]

Argentina

Alfonsin Leaves for Official Visit to Italy

PY082105 Buenos Aires TELAM in Spanish 2050 GMT 8 Dec 87

[Excerpts] Buenos Aires, 8 Dec (TELAM)—President Raul Alfonsin, who left for Italy this afternoon on a 7-day official visit, today said that the agreements he will sign with his Italian counterpart, Francesco Cossiga, are the most important ones yet to be signed during his administration. Alfonsin added that the results of these agreements will become evident as early as the 1st quarter of 1988. [passage omitted]

Alfonsin left Ezeiza Airport today at 1603 leading a large entourage consisting of Economy Minister Juan Sourrouille, Public Works and Services Minister Rodolfo Terragno, and a group of businessmen who will sign agreements with their Italian counterparts. [passage omitted]

'Sources' Say Caputo May Replace Sourrouille

PY090138 Buenos Aires NOTICIAS ARGENTINAS in Spanish 2215 GMT 8 Dec 87

[Text] Buenos Aires, 8 Dec (NA)—Foreign Minister Dante Caputo may replace Juan Sourrouille as head of the Economy Ministry by March, with the implementation of a new economic plan that will focus on growth and emphasize the private sector of the economy.

This opinion was stated by sources of the government and the UCR. However, they declined to say whether President Raul Alfonsin has endorsed Caputo's appointment.

The sources went even further, saying Hugo Gobbi, the current Argentine ambassador to Spain, is certain to replace Caputo at the Foreign Ministry.

The sources indicated that Gobbi's return to the Foreign Ministry from the Madrid embassy "may be the key" indicating that Caputo will indeed replace Sourrouille as head of the Economy Ministry.

The sources admitted that the current economic plan "will only continue until March," and that a new economic program drawn up by the UCR will be implemented.

The sources would not specify which of the plans prepared by the UCR in the last few months will be put into practice next fall.

According to the sources, Caputo's appointment as head of the Economy Ministry, replacing Sourrouille, seems to be the result of the close cooperation between President Alfonsin and Caputo in the last few months, especially since 6 September.

The first reports about Sourrouille's eventual replacement began to circulate a few hours after the UCR electoral defeat on 6 September. At that time Caputo and former Interior Minister Antonio Troccoli were already mentioned as the men who might replace Sourrouille.

The results of the last election were important for Sourrouille because from that moment different sectors of the UCR criticized current economic policies. In late August Ricardo Campero, the Argentine representative of ALADI, and Guillermo Felberg, former Central Bank director, prepared an economic program known as Argentine Growth.

This program was submitted to the UCR convention on 29 October, and 1 week later Senator Luis Leon of Chaco Province presented a proposal to the UCR National Committee to submit to the government a study for the preparation of an economic program that was approved by the convention.

President Alfonsin has expressed support for Sourrouille on two occasions— on 9 September and again on 5 December, during a news conference for foreign journalists accredited in Argentina.

On 20 October Deputies Leopoldo Moreau and Luis Caceres agreed to request of Minister Sourrouille "firmer changes" in the economic policies, and 2 days later Foreign Minister Caputo decided to recheck the foreign debt figures.

Party Withdraws From Consensus Board

PY072339 Buenos Aires BUENOS AIRES HERALD in English 7 Dec 87 p 7

[Text] (NA-DYN)—The Democratic Centre Union (UCEDE) yesterday decided to pull out of the consensus board, reportedly on the grounds that it was not tackling the agreed agenda or engaging in concrete discussion.

UCEDE leader Alvaro Alsogaray last night confirmed that he met President Raul Alfonsin yesterday to inform him of the withdrawal, promising that the party would give a full explanation today. Acording to Alsogaray, the President had expressed a certain disappointment in the consensus board's progress himself.

Alsogaray said his party was interested in discussing three main topics: Argentina's place in the world, defence, and the economic situation.

The UCEDE was not the only third party in action over the weekend. Both the Intransigents and the Christian Democrats held meetings of their national committees on Saturday while the Movement Towards Socialism (MAS) staged a rally in Plaza Once.

The Intransigents decided to call on the Peronists, the Christian Democrats, the Popular Socialists and the Neuquen Popular Movement to present an alternative to the neo-liberal policies now being implemented.

Intransigent leader Oscar Alende accused Economy Minister Juan Sourrouille and Public Works Minister Rodolfo Terragno of following in the footsteps of military regime Economy Minister Jose Martinez de Hoz. The 65 delegates sessioned for 10 hours on Saturday. A new internal line called Popular Action was created.

Christian Democrat leader Carlos Auyero told his party that if it sought an alliance with the left, it would deprive the Peronists of a link with the democratic left.

MAS leader Luis Zamora described socialism as the only way out of the crisis, calling for a worldwide socialist revolution. He blasted prices which rose during freezes, policemen who kidnapped and murdered, and other paradoxes. Zamora said he did not trust Buenos Aires Governor-elect Antonio Cafiero but would join him in pressing for a foreign debt moratorium.

Ex-candidate Silvia Diaz praised the 1917 Russian revolution headed by Vladimir Lenin and Leon Trotsky for having made a world power out of a backward country. Around 20,000 attended the rally where it was confirmed that MAS would not be supporting the CGT rally tomorrow.

Finally, on Saturday the Movement for Integration and Development (MID) also expressed objections to the consensus board, saying that it favoured a ceasefire with Britain.

IMF Loan Planned for Foreign Obligations

PY081422 Buenos Aires Domestic Service in Spanish 1600 GMT 8 Dec 87

[Text] Central Bank Director Daniel Marx has explained that the $225 million received from the IMF will not be funneled into the financial market. According to Marx, this money will be used to pay the country's obligations in foreign currency. Asked to explain the current lack of liquidity, Marx said that in December the people tend to withdraw their money from the banks, thus reducing liquidity.

CGT Strikes; Ubaldini Reiterates Warning

PY090252 Buenos Aires DYN in Spanish 0116 GMT 9 Dec 87

[Excerpt] Buenos Aires, 8 Dec (DYN)—The CGT [General Confederation of Labor] today began its 10th general strike against the government of the Radical Civic Union with a rally in San Justo, which did not live up to the expectations of the organizers. CGT leader Saul Ubaldini reiterated his warnings that the struggle "will continue" if the socioeconomic program is not changed. Ubaldini, who spoke before a crowd of about 15,000 people, harshly criticized the ministers of economy, labor, and public works and services. He reiterated that if the officials of the Economy Ministry do not change their economic program "they should go."

The strike, which began at 1400 today, will continue until midnight tomorrow. On the first day a very large sector of the industrial complex of this city and greater Buenos Aires observed the strike.

However, it was impossible to establish the strike results in other areas because today is a "virtual holiday," with the celebration of the "Immaculate Conception of the Virgin Mary," and there was no activity in the public administration, state enterprises, banks, or insurance companies. [passage omitted]

Military Slated To Receive Salary Increase

PY081752 Buenos Aires Domestic Service in Spanish 1600 GMT 8 Dec 87

[Text] A reliable Defense Ministry source has revealed that military personnel will receive a salary increase of between 16 and 18 percent for the fourth quarter of 1987. The source explained that the increase will be effected through a job reclassification. Thus, the source sought to explain various recent news media reports concerning this salary increase.

Briefs

Military Appointments Noted

Buenos Aires, 7 Dec (TELAM)—Army Deputy Chief of Staff General Miguel Abbate has sworn in General Alfredo Arrellaga, former chief of personnel, as planning director. Gen Arrellaga then swore in Colonel Mario Candido Duaz, former director of the General Lemos Support School at Campo de Mayo, as the new chief of personnel. [Summary] *[Buenos Aires TELAM in Spanish 1312 GMT 7 Dec 87 PY]*

Bolivia

Further on Results of Municipal Elections

ADN Challenges MIR

PY081421 Madrid EFE in Spanish 0210 GMT 8 Dec 87

[Text] La Paz, 7 Dec (EFE)—Today the ADN, headed by General Hugo Banzer Suarez, contested before the Electoral Court of this capital the candidate of the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), the party which yesterday won the municipal elections in Bolivia.

Jose Luis Paredes of the Electoral Court has announced that the ADN has submitted its challenge to disqualify Raul Salomon de la Barra, the MIR's mayoral candidate for La Paz, due to alleged irregularities that occurred during the elections.

The challenge also affects Francisco Aramayo, a MIR candidate for town councillor.

According to Paredes, the ADN maintains that the registration of the two MIR candidates was transferred from Register No 1189 to Register No 1888 the day of the elections.

The president of the Electoral Court has stressed that the ADN maintains that the transfer of the registration was made at an "inopportune" time.

According to Paredes, the plenum of the Electoral Court will meet in the next few hours to define its views regarding the ADN position. The MIR defeated the ADN in La Paz, El Alto, Oruro, and Potosi.

MNR Leadership Meets

PY081601 La Paz La Red Panamericana in Spanish 1130 GMT 8 Dec 87

[Text] The top leaders of the MNR met yesterday to review the results of the municipal elections held on 6 December. The political leaders had asked the members of the cabinet to attend the meeting but apparently none of the ministers attended it.

MNR leader Abel Ayoroa told Panamericana that the party's poor performance in the recent elections is a source of concern and criticized those responsible for this situation. According to Ayoroa, government programs must be revised to make sure that the party will do better in future elections.

The leaders of the MNR are convinced that actions must be taken to close the gaps that are opening up within the party.

Armed Forces Commander Cited

PY081558 La Paz La Red Panamericana in Spanish 1130 GMT 8 Dec 87

[Text] Bolivian Armed Forces Commander in Chief General Jorge Rodriguez Bravo has praised the democratic atmosphere that prevailed during the elections throughout the country. Gen Rodriguez pointed out that democracy is consolidated through processes such as elections that require the participation of the community as a whole.

Gen Rodriguez said that a truly democratic atmosphere prevailed throughout the 6 December elections. He added that the citizenry displayed praiseworthy and exemplary behavior.

The general also announced that today his office will receive the lists of suggested postings from the three branches of the Armed Forces. He said that these lists will be studied by his office and then submitted for the consideration of the Defense Ministry first and the president of the nation second, for final approval.

Interior Minister Calls COB Strike Failure

PY041624 La Paz La Red Panamericana in Spanish 1130 GMT 4 Dec 87

[Text] Interior Minister Juan Carlos Duran said that the COB strike was unimportant and represented a failure for the labor movement. However, he expressed regret in this regard because he believes that the COB should constitute a strong organization to act as an instrument of balance in Bolivian society.

He said that the COB is losing its appeal as a result of the many mistakes it has made, because the strikes and stoppages are rejected by society.

[Begin Duran recording] This worries us. The government and the government party does not seek or desire the weakening of the COB or the labor movement, since they are necessary to maintain a social balance in the country. [end recording]

The interior minister requested that the labor leaders meditate about the current situation and invited them to establish a dialogue about the conflicts. The use of pressure, he said, will not solve the workers' problems but will further damage the country and the workers.

He said that any salary negotiation must be carried out within the framework of Bolivian reality, taking into account the national financial situation.

Central Bank Reserves Drop to $150 Million

PY032103 La Paz La Red Panamericana in Spanish 1700 GMT 3 Dec 87

[Excerpt] According to an official report submitted by the president of the Bolivian Central Bank [BCB], the net reserves of the bank have dropped from $270 million to $150 million. This news has caused concern among the population because of the possible risks of economic destabilization.

The president of the BCB has said that the country should make an effort to preserve the economic situation and maintain the stability that has been achieved with great sacrifice.

The reduction of the net reserves is a result of the critical situation caused by the 10-month wait for Argentina to make payment for the purchase of gas.

This attitude toward a country that is, with great effort, coming out of an inflationary process has caused the unfavorable imbalance in the reserves because the Executive Branch had to resort to these funds to meet urgent internal commitments.

The situation, however, is currently improving as result of the agreement between Bolivia and Argentina on the subject of gas purchases. BCB authorities have said that the reserves will slowly build up again as Argentina makes regular payments for the gas it purchases. [passage omitted]

Brazil

Political Analysts View U.S.-Soviet Detente

PY082048 Madrid EFE in Spanish 1554 GMT 8 Dec 87

[By Adalid Cabrera Lemuz]

[Text] Brasilia, 8 Dec (EFE)—According to Brazilian political analysts, detente between the United States and the Soviet Union, with the signing of the nuclear weapons reduction treaty, will allow the two world powers to gain greater control of their zones of world influence.

Luiz Tuppy, chief of the Brazilian Foreign Ministry's International Organization Department, expressed his conviction that the return of "detente" [preceding world in English] between the Americans and the Soviets will probably have as a side effect the so-called "freeze of power" in the world.

Tuppy stated that although the Soviet-U.S. treaty represents a historic effort for the reduction of short- and medium-range nuclear missiles, it could also lead to the formation of a "world power board" with the strengthening of the hegemony of the two world powers in other regions.

According to the same source, for Brazil this could represent a threat to its aspirations for independence in its foreign policy.

Brazilian authorities are concerned over the nuclear weapons nonproliferation treaty, which has not been ratified by Brazil on the basis of the argument that "in practice it prevents Third World countries from developing their nuclear technology, while industrialized countries are allowed to maintain and expand their atomic arsenals."

Tuppy, who is one of those responsible at the Foreign Ministry for subjects such as world disarmament and East-West relations, stated that Brazil defends the peaceful use of nuclear energy, but does not accept an official prohibition of the production of the atomic bomb.

Brazil is also interested in matters related to disarmament because it is fifth in terms of world production of war materiel and first in Latin America, with earnings of $2.5 billion in 1986.

The sources stated that Brazil's materiel production "does not represent a threat to mankind," and that the great powers that look at Brazil as a threat to their weapons trade have given a distorted image of Brazilian weapons production, especially weapons exported to the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Latin America.

Tuppy stated that the great world powers' objective is to divert world attention from the nuclear arms race to the production of conventional weapons that represent a minor threat.

Brazil, together with Argentina, Mexico, and India, defends peace proposals and condemns the militarization of space.

The same source added that Brazil has not yet established a clear position on the U.S. "Star Wars" program because Brazilian authorities have not yet made a decision regarding its objectives, that is, whether they are defensive, as claimed by the United States, or offensive, as claimed by Soviet Union.

U.S. Reconsideration on Retaliation Urged

PY082342 Brasilia Domestic Service in Portuguese 2100 GMT 8 Dec 87

[Text] Sao Paulo businessmen believe the U.S. Government could reconsider its decision to adopt retaliatory measures against Brazilian goods, and that all that is necesary for this is for President Jose Sarney to approve the software bill passed by Congress.

(Laerte Setubal Filho), president of the Foreign Trade Council of the Sao Paulo State Federation of Industries, FIESP, today said this is what the businessmen are hoping for. (Setubal Filho) noted the consequences a U.S. surcharge would have:

[Begin (Setubal Filho) recording] This problem has upset U.S.-Brazilian trade because, in our case, if the merchandise were shipped today it would arrive in the United States in early January, and the retaliatory measures could already be in force by then, thus causing us a loss of 100 percent of the value of the merchandise. We would be giving the goods away to the U.S. consumers.

[Words indistinct] I believe there is a good possibility the U.S. Government will reconsider its decision, and this should be taken into account. We will then know exactly what goods are affected, and the rest of the exports would continue normally. [end recording]

A few days ago, (Setubal Filho) was in the United States. According to him, the adoption of retaliatory measures is imminent, and they seriously threaten entire Brazilian

enterprises. The enterprises most threatened are those with a large number of workers that produce goods not essential to U.S. consumers.

Situation of Chilean Refugees Said Unclear

PY082359 Rio de Janeiro Rede Globo Television in Portuguese 2155 GMT 8 Dec 87

[Text] Chilean refugees occupying the UN Commissioner's office in Rio de Janeiro have expressed enthusiasm over the possibility of being accepted by the Norwegian Government. The refugees want to leave the country because they fear that General Pinochet's policemen could investigate the kidnapping of a Chilean colonel in Brazil. The Chilean colonel was released in Sao Paulo.

The 22 Chilean refugees today received food donations and expressions of solidarity. Three doctors from the Regional Medical Council have checked the group. They are all well and in good health.

In the afternoon, the refugees received information to the effect that they could go to Norway. The information was relayed over the telephone by the [Norwegian] consul.

Shortly afterward, Merida Morales, chief of the UN High Commissioner's office, arrived with another report. Norway is reportedly studying the possibility of accepting only two refugees, whose documents are already under consideration.

A response from Norway is expected tomorrow. If only two refugees are accepted, the situation at the UN High Commissioner's office will not change. The Chilean refugees intend to remain there until all 22 find a place to go.

PT Meets, Nominates Presidential Candidate

PY071909 Brasilia Radio Nacional da Amazonia Network in Portuguese 0900 GMT 7 Dec 87

[Text] The PT has nominated Deputy Luiz Inacio da Silva as the party's presidential candidate, and has begun discussions on the form of government and the length of the presidential term. On Sunday the PT held its fifth national meeting in the Petronio Portela auditorium at the Senate. Deputy Luiz Inacio da Silva, who is known by the nickname Lula, was nominated as the party's candidate for the nation's presidency.

The PT also elected a new party board headed by Deputy Olivio Dutra, Rio Grande do Sul, who will replace Lula in that position. Henceforth, Lula will be engaged in the electoral campaign on a full-time basis. In an interview, Deputy da Silva revealed the main points and objectives of his electoral platform. [Da Silva recording indistinct] Lula said the PT will run its own presidential candidate regardless of whether the Constituent Assembly institutes a presidential or parliamentary form of government, and whether it approves a 4- or 5-year presidential term. He admitted that his party has initiated contacts with other leftist parties, seeking alliances to back his presidential candidacy. He also said the PT electoral campaign will take to the streets only after the Constituent Assembly makes a decision on the form of government.

In the economic area, Lula [passage indistinct]. This means, he said, creating a national awareness about these matters so the people can demand that a position be defined. In Lula's opinion, Brazil is not the only country burdened with a foreign debt, so it should act jointly with other countries of the Third World. Finally, Lula said agrarian reform will be one of the PT's main electoral slogans.

Chile

Garcia on Carreno Case, Relations With Brazil

PY090117 Madrid EFE in Spanish 0051 GMT 9 Dec 87

[Text] Santiago, 8 Dec (EFE)—Foreign Minister Ricardo Garcia today said that the case of kidnapped Colonel Carlos Carreno, who was released in Sao Paulo, "will not affect relations between Chile and Brazil."

Minister Garcia made this remark just before boarding a plane to go to Quito, Ecuador, where he will attend the foreign ministers meeting of the South Pacific Permanent Commission.

Col Carreno was kidnapped by the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front, FPMR, on 1 September in Santiago, and set free on 2 December in Sao Paulo, Brazil.

Minister Garcia noted that "the fact that the colonel was set free in Sao Paulo demonstrates the existence of terrorist organizations with connections outside Chile's borders." He then said: "Both countries are interested in unraveling this case, and we will give all possible cooperation to the Brazilian police."

As for the 21 Chileans who occupied the UN office in Rio de Janeiro, Minister Garcia said: "This is related to the Brazilian police reaction to the fact that Col Carreno was released in that country."

National Renewal Registers as Political Party

PY050056 Santiago Domestic Service in Spanish 2200 GMT 4 Dec 87

[Text] During a ceremony today at the National Electoral Service, which was attended by all the members of its political board, the National Renewal Party registered itself as a political party with 61,167 members. National

Renewal President Ricardo Rivanedeira told Radio Nacional that the new party will be a bastion of order and of the extension of the government.

[Begin recording] [Rivanedeira] [Words indistinct] a party that will be a bastion of order and of the extension of the work this government has carried out. It will be a party that will struggle against totalitarianism, no matter what kind.

[Question indistinct]

[Rivanedeira] That is right. I do not think Chileans will go backward. I do not think we will return to socialist formulas. I think we will be able to implement our own ideas. Therefore, our role in all this will be very important. We will play a major role in all this. [end recording]

Moreover, National Renewal Vice President Jaime Guzman said this is the first political party to be established throughout the country, and this is very important.

[Begin Guzman recording] We are taking an important step forward. This is the first political party to be established throughout the country. The fact that we are registering with over 60,000 members makes us the registered political party with the highest membership in the political history of Chile.

Mainly we are very optimistic, and this is being shown in the projects we have been carrying out in the past few months. [end recording]

The National Renewal Party was established on 29 April 1987, and the membership process, which began on 9 May 1987, ended before the established deadline expired.

Liberal, Republican Parties Agree To Merge

PY081334 Santiago LA TERCERA DE LA HORA in Spanish 28 Nov 87 p 8

[Text] The Liberal and Republican parties have approved the merger of the two organizations. This agreement was officially announced by leaders of the two parties during a luncheon held at the Union Club.

The new party will be called the Liberal-Republican Party. The merger must be ratified by national councils these parties will hold separately early next month.

The following Liberal Party members participated in the meeting: President Guillermo Toro; Vice President Sergio Trucco, Claudio Cerda, Pedro Esquivel, and Arturo Brand; and General Secretary Ricardo Bustos.

The following Republican Party leaders participated: President Armando Jaramillo; party leaders Julio Subercaseaux, Ignacio Prado, and Gabriel Leon; and Manuel Venegas, a representative of the party youth.

PDC Head Comments on Participation in PPD

PY041533 Santiago CAUCE in Spanish 3 Dec 87 pp 10, 12

[Interview with Christian Democratic Party President Patricio Aylwin by reporter Victor Vaccaro, held in Santiago on 27 November]

[Excerpt] [Vaccaro] Is the decision made by the council of the Christian Democratic Party [PDC] a delaying tactic to gain time regarding its participation in the PPD [Party for Democracy]?

[Aylwin] It is definitely not a delaying tactic. It is not aimed at undermining the PPD. We are really engaged in achieving a broad, serious, and effective agreement among the democratic parties, specifically with the PS [Socialist Party]. We believe that this is essential to help this country return to democracy. We have doubts about the idea of the PPD being the only formula. We believe that there are necessary and basic conditions to be fulfilled with regard to joining the PPD.

[Vaccaro] What are the main doubts and conditions of the PDC?

[Aylwin] We have insisted that it is not only necessary to agree on the basis for governing, as expressed by the National Accord and the Basic Principles for a Democratic Regime, or to struggle for free elections or vote no in the plebiscite as a way to open the path to the accord or the basic principles. We believe that the country should be given a choice. Without a choice the false dilemma of "Pinochet or chaos" could affect many people. We believe it is necessary to go beyond a united effort by reaching agreement on a basic program of government and the way it should be administered under a single leadership.

[Vaccaro] Out of the seven parties which joined the PPD, six have reached a programmatic agreement with the PDC within the framework of the Democratic Alliance. Isn't the fact that you did not accept the invitation to join the PPD a contradiction or an act of disrespect for more direct PDC members?

[Aylwin] What has happened is that the other PPD member, the PS, did not agree on a common program; therefore, there are two different positions in the PPD and we do not believe this is best. We must make an effort to reach universal formulas that can be accepted by all members. This is why we do not rule out the possibility of joining the PPD. It would be a good thing to reach broader agreements between the PPD, the PDC, and, probably, the National Party and the Humanist Party, which are registered separately but with a common proposal to the country.

[Vaccaro] Don't you believe that the PS proposal for a future government agreement sent to you recently by acting PS General Secretary Jorge Molina is sufficient?

[Aylwin] We believe it is real progress, but at the same time not enough. The proposal has other aspects that also concern us. There is talk about a party that is open, without limitations, to all Chileans. The support given to the PPD by some personalities gives this party a range and configuration which do not correspond to our thinking. We are open to agreement on how to govern with other sectors; however, at the level of political alliances for a choice of government we want to move in the areas we indicate. We are afraid that a very broad range may create confusion. We do not reject anyone who, as a democrat, is willing to participate in or struggle for a future democracy.

[Vaccaro] Is your concern, then, the fact that the Communists may join the PPD?

[Aylwin] Of course, according to the terms expressed in the document signed by several personalities, which include several socialists, that possibility does exist and in our opinion that does not help; rather, it undermines authority. [passage omitted]

Briefs

Foreign Investment Figures Given

According to data supplied by the Foreign Investment Committee, foreign investment in Chile in the January-October 1987 period totaled $343.2 million. Foreign investment during 1986 totaled $184 million; in 1985 it totaled $137.5 million; in 1984 it totaled $159.6 million; in 1983 it totaled $182.4 million; and in 1982 it totaled $383.8 million. Of the $343.2 million invested up to October 1987, $168 million was invested in industry, $114 million in mining, and $55.8 million in the utility sector. According to the Foreign Investment Committee report, the rest was invested in agriculture, construction, reforestation, and fishing. [Text] *[Santiago Domestic Service in Spanish 0930 GMT 30 Nov 87 PY]*

Colombia

Minister Alarcon Comments on Economic Outlook

PA041512 Bogota Emisoras Caracol Network in Spanish 1215 GMT 4 Dec 87

[Text] Bogota—Luis Fernando Alarcon, Colombian finance and public credit minister, has stated that the government has established a 20-percent inflation rate goal for 1988. He noted that he has drafted an economic policy to fulfill that goal. For example, the cultivated areas increased by 4 percent, and the impact will be felt next year with a considerable supply of food.

The television program "Caracol Report" ["Reportaje Caracol] revealed an unknown aspect of his personality. He was jolly, open, and youthful—far from the stern stereotype of men who handle such complex matters such as the economy. He had time to comment on a remark by presidential adviser (Gustavo Vasco) that the minister's relationship with the Congress was not good. Alarcon said: I do not know why he said that. I barely know (Vasco). I have only seen him once for 10 or 15 minutes.

Alarcon unveiled certain figures as he presented an encouraging economic balance now that 1987 is coming to an end. The growth rate will be at least equal to the previous year, which was 5.1 percent. Although there was no coffee boom this year, international reserves dropped by just $170 million rather than by the $300 million feared at the beginning of the year.

Minor exports grew over 20 percent when compared to 1986. The inflation rate will exceed the 21-percent goal, but will be less than 20 percent in 1988. The banking system will provide credit for people and industries as long as things do not [words indistinct]. Tax revenues have increased over 45 percent.

FARC Attacks Police Headquarters, Kills 2

PA071740 Bogota EL SIGLO in Spanish 2 Dec 87 p 1

[Unattributed article]

[Text] Two policemen were killed and one was wounded in an attack by 60 guerrillas of the FARC 5th Front in Santa Maria, Choco Department. The dead policemen were identified as Roberto Quintero and Andres Encarnacion Palacios; they tried for more than 4 hours to repel the attack on the police headquarters.

Uruguay

Iglesias on C.A. Situation, Acapulco Meeting

PY071957 Madrid EFE in Spanish 0352 GMT 7 Dec 87

[Text] Montevideo, 6 Dec (EFE)—Uruguayan Foreign Minister Enrique Iglesias today said in Montevideo that the problems encountered by mediator Cardinal Miguel Obando y Bravo in reaching an agreement for a cease-fire between the Nicaraguan Government and the contras "were predictable."

Iglesias, who returned to Montevideo after attending the meetings of the Verification and Follow-Up Commission of the Esquipulas II treaty for Central America, said "the road is not paved but is full of rocks and some thorns."

Iglesias added that "the process will not be easy, but when we look back and see all the things that have been done during the last 4 months with regard to reconciliation, democratization, opening of the media, things that we were able to observe, we realize that great progress has been made."

He said: "I have no doubt that this process will give me headaches, but, as President Julio Maria Sanguinetti has already explained, we cannot expect countries to become democratic in the morning and then make peace in the afternoon."

Iglesias pointed out that the pacification of Central America "is a slow process, but the important thing is to make progress."

Iglesias, who talked to the press at Carrasco International Airport, referred to the recent "meeting of eight presidents" in Acapulco (Mexico). He labeled the meeting as "very important, a historic meeting because it is the first time a meeting like this was held."

He said: "The meeting was useful because a process of regular consultations among presidents was begun."

Iglesias added that "perhaps the most fruitful aspect of the meeting was to give the active diplomacy of the presidents an opportunity to show its value."

Regarding the communique he said: "It was a first statement and had predictable characteristics. It was a kind of founding event and this is why it was rather long."

However, he said, "I would like to say that there were two or three worthy issues: First, the support for democracy reiterated by the presidents, who made this issue the basis of the foreign policy and cooperation they want to carry out;" and "second, the statements of satisfaction with and support for the Central American countries with the commitment to continue working for peace."

Iglesias concluded by saying "regarding the economic issue, the presidents took a firm but calm and responsible position regarding the foreign debt."

The second meeting of presidents of the Group of Eight—Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Panama, Peru, Mexico, Venezuela, and Uruguay—is scheduled for September 1988 in Uruguay.

Seregni Reelected Broad Front President

PY072147 Madrid EFE in Spanish 2346 GMT 6 Dec 87

[Text] Montevideo, 6 Dec (EFE)—General Liber Seregni today was reelected president of the Broad Front, which is the third-largest Uruguayan political force, during the first congress held by this leftist political coalition since its creation in 1971.

The Broad Front congress, which was attended by 2,500 delegates, approved the party's political guidelines and the preelectoral policies based on "a popular, national, and democratic program that opposes the conservative and regressive government policies."

In this report to the party congress, Seregni said: "The Front should clearly see the difference between form and content in a democracy. This is why the Front is going to work hard in the upcoming elections (1989) to become the government."

The Broad Front, which is made up of Socialists, Communists, Christian Democrats, Social Democrats, extreme-left parties, and dissidents of the traditional Blanco and Colorado Parties, obtained 20 percent of the votes in the 1984 elections, which was won by the Colorado Party with 38.6 percent of the votes.

The Front has 21 deputies and 6 senators out of a total of 129 seats.

The Front's program comprises a wide range of political reforms, including the reform of the 1967 Constitution, economic reforms, the nationalization of banks, and agrarian reforms.

Gen Seregni, 61 years of age, said the Front's main task is "to work continually for change," and that to achieve that goal "there is a basic condition: our unity."

The congress was preceded by internal rifts between the parties that make up the Front and other leftist sectors about the need for basic changes in the coalition and to activate its policies.

Hugo Batalla, leader of the Party for the Government of the People, who received the most votes in the last election, admitted that during the congress his party "questioned the Front; as members of the Front we criticized to improve what we feel are the instruments for change."

The former Tupamaro guerrillas, whose membership in the Broad Front was vetoed by the Christian Democratic Party, also for the first time criticized the coalition.

In its biweekly publication MATE AMARGO, the Tupamaros—now a legal party—said that "proposals, actions, and even objectives are distorted in the Front; and as a result the active support of the large independent front's column is weakened."

Sources of the coalition today said "the Front is now closer and more united" after the congress.

The Broad Front, which was created in 1971 as a political alternative to the traditional Colorado and Blanco Parties, which have governed Uruguay since its independence, had to go underground after the 1973 military coup.

Seregni, who had a military career and was the Broad Front presidential candidate in the 1971 elections, was imprisoned until 1984.

Seregni's term will be for 3 years, until the next regular congress in held.

The Front's main political objective in the last few months has been the collection of signatures to abolish the full stop law approved last year by Congress, which suspended the trials against military officers and policemen accused of violating human rights during the 1973-85 military regime.

During the congress the organizers reported they already have 615,000 signatures, and Seregni expressed confidence they will win the plebiscite.

According to law, in order to call for a plebiscite it is necessary to get the signatures of one-fourth of the citizens eligible to vote—about 550,000—which have to be verified by the Electoral Court.

Guyana

PPP Calls for Peacekeeping Force in Haiti

FL081452 Bridgetown CANA in English 1358 GMT 8 Dec 87

[Text] Georgetown, Guyana, Dec 8, CANA—The Marxist opposition People's Progressive Party (PPP) called for deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping force in Haiti.

The PPP, whose leader Dr. Cheddi Jagan was premier of the then British colony of British Guiana in the 1950's and early 1960's, condemned the ruling National Council in Haiti, accusing it of allowing armed gangs to attack voters in elections last month, forcing postponement of the polls.

The PPP said in a statement that the Caribbean Community (Caricom) should approach the UN to organise an international peacekeeping force for Haiti to prepare conditions for free and fair general elections.

The party said that the violence in Haiti had frustrated the wishes of the people for a popularly-elected government, and had led to the deaths of innocent civilians.

Respect For Civil Political Rights Improves

FL072146 Bridgetown CANA in English 1558 GMT 5 Dec 87

[Text] Georgetown, Guyana, Dec 5, CANA—The enjoyment of civil and political rights in Guyana has generally improved during the past year but respect for rights is too dependent on the pleasure of the ruling party, the People's National Congress (PNC) the Guyana Human Rights Association says.

In its just released 1987 human rights report covering the period September 1986 to November 1987, the association said the three main areas of concern are police brutality, restricted access to public information, and the threat to the cultural survival of the indigenous communities.

The report is highly critical of the Guyana Police Force which it accused of inflicting direct violence on detainees and sometimes on innocent suspects, of being too tolerant of violence in police lock-ups by some criminals on others and of corrupt practices.

It charged that sexual assaults often take place on both male and female juveniles in the detention facilities of at least two police stations in the city.

It said there was urgent need to articulate a policy of public safety or security.

It was also essential, the report contended, that effective and independent control of the police force be established if the force is to regain its professional and disciplined approach to its rule.

The report noted, however, that against a background of what it termed increased police violence against criminals, against suspects and their families, and against innocent civilians picked up by the police, a constructive element is evolving with an increased number of policemen being brought before the courts in an effort to raise internal standards within the force.

On the question of civil and political rights, the report said that freedom of expression was adversely affected during the year by restricted access to machinery and newsprint, the victimising of journalists, and complaints of censorship.

It said that the climate in relation to media freedom has improved with the privately owned STABROEK NEWS, a weekly newspaper being allowed to import its own press but contended that while the existence of the STABROEK NEWS suggests a greater degree of tolerance, no legal or administrative steps have been taken by the government to protect the opposition or independent media from the whims of the ruling party.

In this regard, the report said that restrictions on the media exist allegedly due to the unavailability of foreign exchange but contended that even gifts are hedged around by administrative restrictions which are applied according to political criteria.

It said that in the area of freedom of assembly, the government has shown tolerance in the past two years in relation to opposition groups meeting without difficulty and being allowed to use public facilities such as the city hall.

But against this general trend, it said two disturbing incidents occurred recently. It pointed to one case where the police forcibly broke up a small gathering assembled to mark the end of a political fast with a religious service and charged eight persons.

The GHRA report charged that the intolerance which characterised the administration's response to this gathering was reminiscent of the Former President Forbes Burnham era.

The report identified the other disturbing incident as the police arresting and detaining of two members of what it said was an orderly procession of National Workers Union members as they approached parliament to lay a wreath at the statue of the late H.N. Caritchlow, a local labour hero.

Police permission for the exercise had been obtained and no sensible reason was given for arrests and three hour detention of the two persons.

While these incidents remain isolated, they constitute a disturbing reminder once again of the extent to which the liberalisation process depends on moods and circumstances rather than on the protection of the law the report said. It said the right to a popularly elected government was frustrated last December when all opposition parties boycotted municipal elections after the ruling party refused to accede to any of the demands for electoral reform put forward by the opposition.

And, noting that in the area of respect for political and civil rights, there has been some improvements over other years, the report said that political parties and trade unions have been allowed to function for the most part without overt political harassment.

It contended, however, that a disturbing feature of respect for these rights, is the tendency for the police and political authorities to tolerate them only when they are not considered a threat or embarrassment to the ruling party.

The report added: No steps of an administrative or legal nature have been taken to ensure that a constitutional clause which protects these rights will be observed, irrespective of their content. This form of political discrimination undermines the confidence with which any categorical judgement may be made concerning a general improvement in respect for such rights.

The democratic framework which guarantees the respect for right is absent thereby reducing the enjoyment of rights and freedoms to an unpredictable status dependent on personal whims.

The GHRA report also contended that a particular area of concern during the past year had to do with [the fact that] the right to information is so restricted at present as to prevent the effective participation of either individual Guyanese citizens or non-governmental organisations in public life.

This withholding of information, it said, is one of the most systematically practiced violations of civil rights in Guyana. And, as a result, of this policy of treating public information as its private property, the government of Guyana suffers a serious credibility problem (and) no statement of importance appearing in the state-owned media is taken at its face value.

Bail Posted for Opposition Activists

FL071445 Bridgetown CANA in English 1516 GMT 5 Dec 87

[Text] Georgetown, Guyana, Dec 5, CANA—Two female members of the opposition Working People's Alliance (WPA) who on Thursday elected to go to jail rather than lodge 200 dollars bail pending the hearing of charges against them, were bailed on Friday. Andaiye Williams and Karen De Souza spent Thursday night in the lock-ups at the La Penitence Police Station here.

On Friday, however, Roman Catholic priest and University of Guyana lecturer Malcom Rodrigues reportedly persuaded them to accept bail.

They were later escorted to the Georgetown Magistrate's Court where the necessary bail was lodged for their release.

They were charged, together with six other persons, for offences allegedly committed outside parliament on November 11 when police, contending that a gathering of persons was encumbering the pavement prevented a religious service from being held.

The service had been planned to mark the end of a 10-day fast led by WPA co-leader Eusi Kwayana protesting, among other things, the then shortage of gasolene and kerosene.

Among the six other defendants is Barbadian novelist George Lamming.

Suriname

Election Winner Outlines Government Aims

PM080953 Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 28 Nov 87 p 3

[Interview with Surinamese National Party leader Henk Arron by Hans Buddingh': "Arron: On to Democracy and Development in Suriname"]

[Text] Paramaribo, 28 Nov—It was a curious and historic meeting yesterday between Surinamese National Party leader Henk Arron and Army leader Desi Bouterse. The same Bouterse who toppled Arron from the

post of prime minister 25 February 1980 came to meet him more than 7 years later to congratulate him on his resounding election victory, which also represented a humiliation for the military.

"Things are only fair, but I am not someone who pays attention to the past." Arron said this somewhat aloofly. However, he cannot hide the fact that his removal from office and imprisonment have had a considerable effect on him.

"Of course, 1980 has not left me completely unaffected. But a little while later a copy of Anwar al-Sadat's autobiography, 'In Search of Identity,' came into my hands. That book was crucially important to my subsequent attitude. Al-Sadat spent his time in prison under worse conditions and from it became spiritually mature. And I too grew spiritually mature as a result."

[Buddingh'] The people welcomed the coup in 1980 because they were dissatisfied. Had you therefore made mistakes?

[Arron] What do you call mistakes? If your rival teaches the people every day how bad things are, the people will start to believe it. Now the Surinamese people have passed judgment in the election on what existed in the past and what they got in its place. The support for the Front [Front for Democracy and Development] is a choice in favor of the old parties and the old politics. However, I would like to point out that the parties have adapted themselves to changed circumstances.

[Buddingh'] Will there now be policies different from those from before 1980?

[Arron] Policies will be more rational and less emotional. We will work against the political favors for certain people—of which there was talk in the past—and the wasting of human resources in the development process. In the future, the right man must end up in the right job. I, too, am ,of course, a few years older and politically more mature. But it must be admitted that mistakes have been made.

[Buddingh'] Will the Front not fall apart now that its common enemy is gone? There are after all people with differing views in the Front. And there are also radical divisions.

[Arron] That is true. There are ideological differences, but there is nevertheless quite a lot which binds us: the national interest, our ties with the land, our desire for prosperity, the striving for national unity and stability. The partners in the Front have still to grow toward each other, but the leaders know each other and the parties' programs are not very different. Radical differences are no longer so important. Our base ideology is nationalist, and here we take as our point of departure a democratic constitutional state and social justice.

[Buddingh'] Will the Front remain agreed on this? Haven't the people voted for the Front primarily to get rid of the military?

[Arron] The people have indeed voted resolutely for a different policy. In my view they will remain firm on this point. If we in Suriname begin to think in world ideologies such as socialism or communism and so on, we will simply end up even further from home. These theories are nice to know and to apply now and then, but we cannot go on wasting our time on them. [Arron ends]

Arron does not know whether one party will emerge from the Front. According to Arron there must eventually be a two-party system in Suriname. Arron does not expect that the Front will ever win a monster victory like last Wednesday's. This means that an opposition could arise.

[Buddingh'] Will the people not be quickly disappointed if the Front does not come up to expectations?

[Arron] I do indeed feel the greatest responsibility I have ever had on my shoulders, but we have prepared the people to understand that the problems cannot be solved in one day and that belts must be tightened. The people know that.

[Buddingh'] In the election campaign reference was made to the importance of the aid from the Netherlands. Does this not undermine the formation of an individual Surinamese identity, and does it not increase dependence?

[Arron] We do indeed have to work on our own identity. I do not see the Netherlands as the angel of deliverance, or as some kind of Piet Hein [Dutch humorist] with his treasure fleet.

[Buddingh'] Must aid be continued on the basis of the current treaty, or will it have to be internationalized as the Netherlands wants?

[Arron] On the Netherlands side there is the need to terminate the special agreement. We will not take part in any such action and are not in favor of an internationalization of aid. Relations vis-a-vis development aid were clearly formulated in 1975. At that time the Netherlands assumed a special responsibility, and this cannot simply be set aside. The Netherlands also committed itself to continuing with development cooperation after the expiration of the 15-year agreement. It would be stupid not to keep the Netherlands to this.

[Buddingh'] There is a lot of money invested in the large-scale West Suriname project (a dam and aluminum smelter). Opponents wanted smaller-scale projects from which the little man would also profit. Will the way in which development aid funds are spent have to change?

[Arron] We are now 8 years on. Policies must therefore be adjusted. We will have to take stock of things. But I would say that I particularly regret that the development of West Suriname has stagnated. I feel particularly strong links with West Suriname. The project is not simply to do with the exploitation of hydroelectric power and bauxite, but also with improvements in agriculture and fisheries. The plan is still there. The problem is that the finances that are now needed are many times what they were then. But in West Suriname there are immense deposits of bauxite, and elsewhere in Suriname bauxite is becoming exhausted. I am convinced that it is economically exploitable. But I would like to say that the pre-1980 policy did not sufficiently recognize that there was not a choice between large and small projects, but that they go together. And then the small farmer can really get to work.

[Buddingh'] Are you afraid of another intervention by the military?

[Arron] Yesterday the Army commander and all his commandants congratulated the three leaders of the Front. As a result the first important step on the way to national stability has been taken.

[Buddingh'] Human rights are mentioned in the Constitution. What will happen about violations of human rights in the past?

[Arron] Surinamese problems are solved in Surinamese ways through specific Surinamese characteristics. That is all I want to say.

[Buddingh'] A Front government is faced with the fact that part of the country is under the control of Brunswijk's Jungle Commando. Will you negotiate with them?

[Arron] The answer is short: We have to solve things rationally and with common sense. Not with emotions.

[Buddingh'] Is this question the responsibility of the government or the Army?

[Arron] Of every Surinamer.

[Buddingh'] The Front can amend the Constitution if it has a two-thirds majority and could therefore change the position of the military in the structure of the state. Will there be rapid changes to the Constitution?

[Arron] I do not think that this is one of our primary objectives. Our primary objectives are democracy and its successful implementation, development, national unity, and stability.

Gives News Conference

PM081043 Amsterdam DE VOLKSKRANT in Dutch 30 Nov 87 p 4

[Wim Noordegraaf dispatch: "Arron Advocates Resumption of West Suriname Project"]

[Text] Paramaribo—If it were up to Surinamese National Party Chairman Henk Arron the West Suriname project would be resumed as soon as possible. The Surinamese National Party is one of the three parties which make up the Front for Democracy and Development which inflicted a major election defeat on Bouterse's National Democratic Party [NDP]. "West Suriname" is the plan for the exploitation of the bauxite regions on the border with (formerly British) Guyana inaugurated in 1975 by the then Arron government.

The plan provided for the construction of a dam at Kabalebo and an electricty-generating station for the bauxite industry and for the export of electricty to Guyana. In 1978 the project had already become a controversial issue for the Commission for Netherlands-Surinamese Development Cooperation, because in the view of the Netherlands representatives the West Suriname project was threatening to swallow a disproportionate share of development money. When granting the 3 billion guilders at the time of independence in 1975 the Netherlands had made it a condition that within the framework of the long-term development plan 25 percent of this money should be spent on infrastructure, 50 percent on projects which would lead directly to new production, and 25 percent on social and educational projects. "West Suriname" came entirely under the heading of infrastructure and was growing increasingly expensive.

In 1981 the Chin A. Sen government decided "under Bouterse" to stop the project because prospects on the world bauxite market were growing less and less favorable and falling oil prices would make the energy production of the dam too expensive. At that time an 80-km stretch of railroad for the transport of bauxite was the only thing that had been built. This railroad runs "from nothing to nowhere," because no bauxite is being mined and the planned bauxite production settlement of Apoera does not exist. But there are large numbers of studies and reports.

"We will take all these reports out of the closets and blow the dust off them," Arron said at a news conference. He regretted that the project was halted. "West Suriname" could now have been offering employment to 20-30,000 people and have prevented the migration to Paramaribo. Arron dismissed the suggestion that the project was a white elephant. "The effect of the project on agriculture and fishing has always been ignored," Arron said.

On the subject of the human rights violations in the last few years Arron said: "I will not create a situation which will not signify a retrospective solution." Nor did he see

any reason to change the Constitution in the short term, although the Front is able to do so with its two-thirds majority in the National Assembly. "The Constitution offers adequate prospects for the future," Arron said. "Everything depends on what we make of them. There are countries with finer constitutions. But that is not to say that these countries behave better."

On the subject of the fighting between the Army and the Jungle Commando Arron said: "I hope that every Surinamer, no matter where he is, will understand that if every single person wants to win, win, win, we would all end up losers."

Arron will dispute the results of the elections in the districts in which a state of war prevails. "This is a question of principle." If the results from the interior are declared invalid by the independent Election Bureau, the Front will have 40 of the 51 seats in the National Assembly. Bouterse's NDP only succeeded in winning one seat. If the results from the interior are included, this gives the NDP an additional seat. The other nine seats were won by the small left-wing PALU [Progressive Workers and Farm Laborers Union] and the Javanese-based Pendawalima, which entered into cooperation with the maroon grouping, the "Rural Dwellers' Party," shortly before the election.

Five Members Elected to Military Authority

FL071908 Paramaribo International Service in English 1730 GMT 7 Dec 87

[Text] The [word indistinct] of the National Army by secret ballot last Friday elected five members to the Military Authority. According to provisions in the Constitution, this body is regarded as the political arm of the Army and will represent it in the state council. Ninety percent of the votes went to Commander Bouterse who will possibly become the chairman of this organ. Also elected to the Military Authority are: Commander Ivan Graanoogst, Captain (Chuck Maynoff), Major Badressein Sital, and Major (Ramon Lee Wen tai). Two substitute members were also elected. They are Captain (Sepmee) and Captain (Janhoosing).

Candidates were drawn from the rank of corporal upwards and 80 percent of the Army electorate exercised the vote. The outcome of the election was greeted with great enthusiasm in the barracks. In a short speech, Commander Bouterse told his colleagues that the members of the Military Authority will represent the Army with honor and consciously. Bouterse said: This political organ of the Army has a historical task which has to do with the democracy which has been acquired, the defense of the country's sovereignty, and to contribute to peace and stability in our country.

The life of the Military Authority will span a 5-year period and shortly the oath will be taken before the president.

Bouterse Says Military To Ensure Stability

FL071919 Paramaribo International Service in English 1730 GMT 7 Dec 87

[Text] Members of the Military Authority know that only stability can bring development in our country, and we will do everything possible to ensure it. This assurance was given by Commander Bouterse last Friday night during a press conference shortly after the announcement of the results of the election for the Military Authority. According to Bouterse, Suriname has the unique chance to have development and said that the Army will serve the nation.

Earlier in the day when Bouterse went to cast his vote, he said the Army also [word indistinct] democracy. Elections in the Army took place a week and a half after national elections were held in our country. The Military Authority will represent the Army in the state council but it's not yet known who will sit in the state council. When asked about this, Bouterse said there are still some things which must be settled by law, including the law on the Military Authority. He added that in this respect, I think we could help the lawmakers by leading the cause.

Meets With Party Chairmen

FL081749 Paramaribo International Service in English 1730 GMT 8 Dec 87

[Text] Government leader Bouterse yesterday spoke with the chairman of the political parties which will be represented in the National Assembly. The government leader thought it necessary to exchange views in order to clear up misunderstandings which surfaced after the declaration by the Independent Elections Office.

Also present at the meeting was Home Affairs Minister Jules Wijdenbosch who explained the procedures to be followed now.

The Central Elections Office will dispatch official reports to all 51 elected members of the National Assembly. They will then be sworn in, after which during the first meeting of the body, the letters of credence will be investigated.

Front To Defer Reponse to Brunswijk Cease-Fire

PM081543 Amsterdam DE VOLKSKRANT in Dutch 2 Dec 87 p 3

[Wim Noordegraaf dispatch: "Front To Wait Before Reacting to Brunswijk's Cease-fire"]

[Excerpt] Paramaribo—For the time being the Front for Democracy and Development will not react to the approaches by Ronnie Brunswijk. On the NOS-JOURNAAL program yesterday Brunswijk announced that he will observe a cease-fire until 1 January. A member of

the Central Executive of the Progressive Reformed Party, one of the three parties making up the Front, said that Brunswijk has not as yet sought any official contacts, but that the Front is also not in a position to react.

"We have not received any formal request for talks. And if such a request were to come, we would not be able to do anything, because at the present moment the Front has no legal base. Only when a government has been formed could we do something," the Central Executive member said. The formation of a government is not expected until early next year at the earliest. First the new National Assembly must be installed, and it must elect a president. The president will then chair the government formation process. [Passage omitted]

3 Protests Filed on Emergency Areas Polling

FL072021 Paramaribo International Service in English 1730 GMT 7 Dec 87

[Text] On Friday, three protests were handed in at the independent elections office after the results of the November 25th elections were officially announced. Two of the protests come from contestants in the elections, the Suriname Labor Party and the Progressive Workers' and Farmers' Union, PALU. The third concerns a joint statement by the four federations of trade unions and the trade and industry association. With the exception of the PALU, these organizations are protesting against the extension of the period for the nomination of candidates in the three emergency areas and the placing of ballot boxes for these areas in Paramaribo. They also refer to the unsafe situation in these areas which they said was the reason why only a small majority of the elegible voters were able to cast their ballots.

PALU, on the other hand, is of the opinion that it will be highly irresponsible to have discussions now on the validity of the elections in some parts of the country. This is why this party protests against the decision of the independent elections office to declare the outcome of the three districts null and void.

Observers Praise Suriname Poll Organization

PM081627 Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 3 Dec 87 p 3

[Unattributed report: "Netherlands Observers: Praise of Organization"]

[Text] The Hague, 3 Dec—According to the five Netherlands observers there are no objections to last Wednesday's Surinamese elections. In their report to Foreign Minister van den Broek which was handed over to the Second Chamber today they conclude that the Wijdenbosch government kept its promise of free and secret elections. "The organizers deserve great praise, especially given the short space of time in which the elections finally had to be organized," the observers state.

The five observers—former Second Chamber Deputies G.C. van Dam, H.M. Franssen, and A. Geurtsen, and development cooperation experts T.G.J. Kerstiens and P. Nelissen—write in their report of some individual shortcomings on the day of the elections, but give no indication anywhere of bad faith. "The registration of voters appeared to run more smoothly than might have been expected. Those involved in the organization and implementation of the elections discharged their duties fully," the report states.

During the campaign too the various parties were able to voice their views freely, the observers write, although the opposition parties' access to the media was not without hindrance.